bitsCrunch audit reports

BNB Chain, Ethereum, Polygon (POS)bitscrunch.comXGitHub

bitsCrunch has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 12 Dec 2023; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm9

Statuses are the security firms’ own

9 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 6 low (6 open, 3 acknowledged).

High
3
Low
6
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Initial Token Distribution

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion For Function `bill()`

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion on `dueBalance`

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion on `scheme` Selection

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incompatibility With Deflationary Tokens

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    No Thresholds when changing rewards and fees

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
bitsCrunchSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 1 medium · 17 low
12 fixed · 3 acknowledged · 6 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings21

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium001
Low6011
LowDiscussion For Function `bill()`bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

The user can invoke the `bill()` function to make a bill payment. The passed-in parameter `_schemeId` is required to be greater than 0. Thus the if statement of `_schemeId != 0` will always be entered each time the function is invoked. That is to say, the users are required to switch the scheme each time they call this function. ```solidity=101 if(_schemeId != 0){ require(userAccounts_[_accountId].discountScheme != _schemeId,"CPay:ERR8"); _switchScheme(_accountId,_schemeId); } ```

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LowDiscussion on `dueBalance`bitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

The variable `dueBalance` represents the amount of assets owed by the customer, and we notice that the function `addFunds()` can be called to recharge when the user has insufficient assets, but if the user doesn't recharge, calls `unstakeBCUT()` to exit, and re-creates a new account, there may be a large amount of bad debt in the protocol. File CustomerPayout.sol: ```solidity=131 userAccounts_[_accountId].dueBalance += (discountedAmount - userAccounts_[_accountId].balance); ``` File Staking.sol: ```solidity=152 function unstakeBCUT(uint _accountId) external nonReentrant { address _user = _msgSender(); require(userAccounts_[_accountId].owner == _user,"CS:ERR6"); uint256 stakedAmount = discountSchemes_[userAccounts_[_accountId].discountScheme].stakeAmount; require(stakedAmount > 0,"CS:ERR8"); userAccounts_[_accountId].discountScheme = 0; TokenUtils.pushTokens(bcutToken_, _user, stakedAmount); emit Unstaked(_accountId, stakedAmount); } ```

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LowDiscussion on `scheme` SelectionbitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

The function `selectScheme()` can be called to select a new discount scheme for the customer in the bill. The customer can then choose the scheme with the largest discount. Our understanding is that, a larger discount is bonded with a larger staking amount and/or a longer lock period. The available scheme options is not found in the current smart contracts.

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LowIncompatibility With Deflationary TokensbitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. As a result, an inconsistency in the amount will occur and the transaction may fail due to the validation checks. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) to the target contract, only 90 tokens actually arrive to the contract. In the `Billing` contract, the `addFunds()` function calls `TokenUtils.pullTokens()` to transfer `userAccounts_[_accountId].coin` from the `_user` to the contract. The `coin` is set by the owner address of the `Customer` contract in the `createAccount()` function.

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LowNo Thresholds when changing rewards and feesbitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

In the Operator contract, there are two functions `setMaximumReward()` and `setMinFee()`, callable by the owner address, that can change the maximum reward and the minimum fee. We noticed that the only restriction for the owner address to set the `operatorFees_.minFee` and `operatorFees_.maxReward` is that the fee and the reward should be greater than 0 and less than `percentage_`.

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsagebitsCrunch · CertiK · 12 Dec 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=16 ISwapRouter public swapRouter; ``` - The contract `SwapTokens` interacts with third party contract with `ISwapRouter` interface via `swapRouter`.

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bitsCrunch: questions

Is bitsCrunch audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for bitsCrunch, dated 12 Dec 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“bitsCrunch”).

Who audited bitsCrunch?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for bitsCrunch.

Are there open findings in bitsCrunch’s audits?

9 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 6 low (6 open, 3 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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