Arcas has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 7 Dec 2023; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 1 medium, 2 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged).
Centralization Related Risks in `TokenV1`
Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration · CertiK · 7 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Initial Rewards Distribution in `TokenV1`
Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration · CertiK · 7 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
Arcas Ecosystem Token & Vesting Manager · CertiK · 6 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
Arcas Ecosystem Token & Vesting Manager · CertiK · 6 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Variable `rewards[account]` Not Updated in Functi
Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration · CertiK · 7 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Inaccurate `totalSupply`
Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration · CertiK · 7 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Incompatibility with Deflationary Tokens
Arcas Ecosystem Token & Vesting Manager · CertiK · 6 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 2 high · 1 medium · 1 low 2 acknowledged · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Arcas Ecosystem Token & Vesting Manager | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 2 high · 1 medium · 5 low 5 fixed · 2 acknowledged · 1 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 4 |
```solidity function includeInRewards(address _account) public onlyOwner() { require(excludedFromRewards[_account], "Account is already included in rewards"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardExcluded.length; i++) { if (rewardExcluded[i] == _account) { rewardExcluded[i] = rewardExcluded[rewardExcluded.length - 1]; actual[_account] = 0; excludedFromRewards[_account] = false; rewardExcluded.pop(); break; } } } ``` Variable `rewards[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders. The Rate was higher at the moment of the `excludeFromReward(account)` call, so the `rewards[account] / actual[account]` ratio is bigger than expected for accounts included in the reward.
Open the reportThe contract is structured to deduct a fee from each transaction and apportion it to designated addresses. However, potential issues can arise when a specific address, such as `prizePoolMultiSigAddress`, has not been initialized or is set to the zero address, and the `prizePoolTaxAlloc` is not zero. In such a scenario, the fee is still deducted but isn't directed to any address. This could lead to a decrease in the actual total supply of tokens in circulation, causing it to be less than the `ACTUAL_TOTAL` constant. The root cause of this issue lies in the way the `_updatePrizePoolFee()` function operates. If the `prizePoolMultiSigAddress` is `address(0)`, this function simply returns nothing, despite the total fee deduction occurring in the `_transfer()` function. ```solidity=918 function _updatePrizePoolFee(uint256 _prizePoolFee) private { if (prizePoolMultiSigAddress == address(0)) { return; } ```
Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=57 arcas.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), totalAmount); ``` - Transferring tokens by `totalAmount`. ```solidity=58 arcas.approve(address(this), totalAmount); ``` - The `totalAmount` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees. - Note: `approve` is an external function and its behavior wasn't evaluated.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Arcas, dated 6 Dec 2023 to 7 Dec 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Old Block Ape Scissors Token Security & Migration”).
CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Arcas.
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 1 medium, 2 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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