BurnsDeFi has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 29 Feb 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
13 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 medium, 9 low (all open).
Ineffective `isContract()` Check
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Native tokens left in the contract
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Potential flashloan attack due to reliance on a s
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Potential Reentrancy Risk Due to Violation of Che
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Potential Sandwich Attacks
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Question related to reward design
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Risk of Airdrop Failure Due to Gas Exhaustion
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
State Variable Should Be Declared Constant
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Third-Party Dependency Usage
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Unnecessary Use of SafeMath
Burns-Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burns-Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 2 addresses on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 4 medium · 10 low 3 fixed · 13 open | Original removed |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 9 | 0 | 1 |
The implementation of the `isContract` check can not cover all scenarios. The check can be bypassed if the call is from the constructor of a smart contract or when the contract is destroyed. Because, in that case, the code size will also be zero. The comments mention that "it's unsafe to rely on the check and it can be bypassed".
Open the reportIf the `msg.value` does not strictly equal to 0.002 or the `burnedfi` has already launched, BNBs sent to the airdrop contract will be locked forever since the function won't revert. ```solidity=43 function _drop() internal { if ( msg.value == _value && !_burnedFi.launch() && _msgSender() != address(this) ) { require(_msgSender() == tx.origin, "Only EOA"); if (_countBlock < 20) { ++_countBlock; ++totalDroped; ++threshold; if (totalDroped == 1 || totalDroped % 300 == 0) { _deployLiquidity(); } require( _burnedFi.balanceOf(address(this)) >= _singleAmount, "Droped out" ); _burnedFi.transfer(_msgSender(), _singleAmount); ++_userCount[_msgSender()]; require(_userCount[_msgSender()] <= 100, "Limit 100 num!"); emit Droped(_msgSender(), totalDroped); } else if (_block != block.number) { _block = block.number; _countBlock = 0; } if (totalDroped >= 150000) { _burnedFi.setLaunch(true); uint256 amount = payable(address(this)).balance; payable(address(_burnedFi)).transfer(amount); } } }
Open the reportThe contract's reliance on a single Dex pair for price feeds in the `Stats` function exposes it to flashloan attack risks. An attacker can use a flashloan as the initial funds for an exploit to enlarge the profit or manipulate the `FIXME` token price in decentralized exchanges. The `burnToHolder()` function relies on price calculations that are based on-chain, meaning they are susceptible to flash-loan attacks by manipulating the price of given pairs to the attacker's benefit. In this case, the attacker could pump the `burnfi` token price to get more `burnbuild` tokens as returns in this function call.
Open the reportThe native token is transferred to the `to` in line 627 before the state variables are updated in lines 636-637 (effects), which deviates from the checks-effects-interaction pattern. This could lead to potential re-entrancy risks. Sending native tokens will trigger the `receive()` functions in the receiver contract. An attacker can make a recursive call back to the original function. During such a reentrant call, the state variables are not yet updated (the caller still holds `burnfi` token), enabling the attacker to re-enter the original contract and claim rewards multiple times. However, the `to.transfer()` call has a strict gas limit of 2300, which is typically insufficient for any significant computations or state changes in the called contract. This restriction constrains the actions an attacker can perform in the receiver's contract, thereby reducing the potential impact of the reentrancy attack, but the risk still exists. ```solidity=619 function receiveRewards(address payable to) external { address addr = msg.sender; uint256 balance = balanceOf(addr); uint256 amount = balance.sub(burnAmount[addr]); //.sub(Rewards[addr]); require(amount > 0 ); Rewards[addr] = Rewards[addr].add(amount); historyRewards[addr] = historyRewards[addr].add(amount); to.transfer(amount.mul(10**9)); _transfer(addr, address(this), balance); burnAmount[addr]=0; totalReceive = totalReceive.add(amount); emit ReceiveReward(addr, amount, totalReceive); } ```
Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `addLiquidityETH()`
Open the reportThe project will share exceeded rewards of the user to the project. The user might not be aware of the exceeded rewards and doesn't call function `burnToHolder` to increase maximum rewards in advance.
Open the report```solidity=56 if (totalDroped == 1 || totalDroped % 300 == 0) { _deployLiquidity(); } ``` Users have to pay for the gas of adding liquidity if the condition `totalDroped % 300 == 0` is met. If the user fails to set enough gas limit for this transaction, calls to the `_drop()` will revert and therefore block the airdrop process.
Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=121 uint256 public burnFee = 2; ``` - `burnFee` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=122 uint256 public taxFee = 10; ``` - `taxFee` should be declared `constant`.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. --- ```solidity=29 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapRouter; ``` - The contract `BurnsAirdrop` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapRouter`. --- ```solidity=119 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapRouter; ``` - The contract `BurnsDeFi` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapRouter`. --- ```solidity=123 burnsRewardHold public burnsHolder; ``` - The contract `BurnsDeFi` interacts with third party contract with `burnsRewardHold` interface via `burnsHolder`.
Open the reportThe `SafeMath` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow. ```solidity=16 library SafeMath { ``` - An implementation of `SafeMath` library is found. --- ```solidity=17 using SafeMath for uint256; ``` - `SafeMath` library is used for `uint256` type in `BurnsAirdrop` contract. ```solidity=83 uint256 _amount = _deployAmount.mul(threshold); ``` - `SafeMath.mul` is called in `_deployLiquidity` function of `BurnsAirdrop` contract. *Note: Only a sample of 2 `SafeMath` library usage in this contract (out of 4) are shown above.* --- ```solidity=118 using SafeMath for uint256; ``` - `SafeMath` library is used for `uint256` type in `BurnsDeFi` contract. ```solidity=229 uint256 _burnFees = amount.mul(burnFee).div(1000); ``` - `SafeMath.mul` is called in `_transfer` function of `BurnsDeFi` contract. *Note: Only a sample of 2 `SafeMath` library usage in this contract (out of 7) are shown above.*
Open the reportThe smart contract does not check or store the return value of an external call in a local or state variable, which may introduce vulnerabilities due to the unhandled outcome. ```solidity=95 token.approve(address(uniswapRouter), tokenAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=97 uniswapRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}( address(_burnedFi), tokenAmount, 0, // slippage is unavoidable 0, // slippage is unavoidable address(0xdead), block.timestamp ); ```
Open the reportIt is not recommended to use Solidity's `transfer()` and `send()` functions for transferring native tokens, since some contracts may not be able to receive the funds. Those functions forward only a fixed amount of gas (2300 specifically) and the receiving contracts may run out of gas before finishing the transfer. Also, EVM instructions' gas costs may increase in the future. Thus, some contracts that can receive now may stop working in the future due to the gas limitation. ```solidity=77 payable(address(_burnedFi)).transfer(amount); ``` - `BurnsAirdrop._drop` uses `transfer()`. --- ```solidity=315 payable(address(burnsHolder)).transfer(balance); ``` - `BurnsDeFi.burnToholder` uses `transfer()`.
Open the reportThe linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x4fb9…21fd0x4fb9657ac5d311dd54b37a75cfb873b127eb21fd | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x91f1…d7ba0x91f1d3c7ddb8d5e290e71f893bad45f16e8bd7ba | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for BurnsDeFi, dated 29 Feb 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Burns-Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for BurnsDeFi.
13 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 medium, 9 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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