Camp security record

As of 19 Nov 2026, Camp has 3 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 5 Sep 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings.

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Across 3 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits3

Newest first

1 other security report listed, not counted

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Camp - NFTSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Camp - Re-Audit

Version of an earlier report: counted once with it

Security firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Camp Network - 2Security firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
CampSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗

Findings30

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0060
Medium0140
Low0441

Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firms. Not counted as findings.

Informational`WrappedCAMP` Accounting for `totalSupply` Is Impacted by `selfdestruct` OpcodeCamp · Quantstamp · 7 Aug 2025Acknowledged

This contract mints wrapped tokens in a 1:1 ratio for native token deposits. The `totalSupply()` of this token contract is determined by querying `address(this).balance`. However, the balance of the contract can differ from the total sum of deposits if another contract forces a native token transfer using `selfdestruct`, which circumvents the otherwise correctly implemented `receive()` function. This opcode is deprecated, but currently still supported and can be used in this manner.

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UndeterminedThe Codebase Requires Vulnerable DependenciesCamp · Quantstamp · 7 Aug 2025Acknowledged

Running the `npm install` command to install the dependencies highlights 17 vulnerabilities (2 low, 14 high, 1 critical). This may introduce backdoors, known vulnerabilities or unexpected behavior into the system.

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InformationalDeleted and Disputed Tokens Still Receive RoyaltiesCamp - NFT · Quantstamp · 5 Sep 2025Fixed

Royalties are paid out when access to associated tokens in purchased. The `_distributeRoyalty()` function is responsible for calculating and distributing the generated profit among the token owner and the parent tokens. Currently, the state of the parent token is not checked, therefore `DELETED` and `DISPUTED` tokens keep earning royalties through derivatives.

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InformationalMarketplace Can Receive Native Tokens without Ability to RescueCamp - NFT · Quantstamp · 5 Sep 2025Fixed

The marketplace contract exposes an empty `receive()` function that is capable of receiving native tokens. However, these tokens are then stuck in the contract, as there is no way to rescue them. Further, the contract does not require a way to receive native tokens without associated action.

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InformationalParent Tagging Is Slower than MintingCamp - NFT · Quantstamp · 5 Sep 2025Fixed

The dispute module allows users to accuse token owners of intellectual property infringement, and get the token blocked after judgement by the contract owner. Judgement can be cast after some cooldown period has elapsed, which allows the token owner to assert counterevidence. Disputes should then propagate to derived tokens, this is initiated by users notifying the contract using the `tagChildIp()` function. In its current form, this raises a new dispute for the child token. However, a new derivative tokens could be minted before the cooldown period of this dispute has elapsed, leading to a potential scenario where the dispute module cannot catch up with minting.

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InformationalVery Small Prices Can Be Rounded to 0Camp - NFT · Quantstamp · 5 Sep 2025Fixed

During the `buyAccess()` operation, royalty calculations are applied to the price. For very low prices, and very low bps the result could be rounded to 0, resulting in empty transfers. ``` solidity uint16 constant DENOMINATOR = 10_000; function applyBps(uint256 amount, uint16 bps) internal pure returns (uint256) { return (amount * bps) / DENOMINATOR; // <-- If amount * bps < DENOMINATOR, this will round to 0 } ```

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InformationalMissing Recipient Address ValidationCamp - Re-Audit · Quantstamp · 14 Aug 2025Fixed

In `bridgeOut()`, the `_to` parameter specifies the recipient address. However, there is no check to ensure `_to` is not the zero address.

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InformationalMissing Documented Access Control for `batchRelease()` FunctionCamp · Quantstamp · 7 Aug 2025Fixed

The README document suggests that the contract allows the batched release of matured deposits by a authorized keeper. However, the corresponding `batchRelease()` function is not access controlled, and no `keeper` role is assigned to any user. However, this function may not need to rely on a privileged user for execution, and instead may exploit the natural incentive of queued depositors to ensure smooth bridging operations.

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InformationalNo Method to Handle Funds Sent via the Empty `receive()` Function in the `CampStaker` ContractCamp · Quantstamp · 7 Aug 2025Fixed

The `CampStaker` contract has an empty `receive()` function, allowing to receive native tokens. However there is no method to withdraw any native tokens if they are sent to the contract.

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InformationalUnchecked Uint256 to Uint128 Down-Cast May Truncate Very Large DepositsCamp · Quantstamp · 7 Aug 2025Fixed

The `bridgeOut()` function performs unchecked down-casting from `uint256` to `uint128` when storing deposit amounts in the `Deposit` struct. Both `_originalAmount` and `_minAmount` parameters are cast to `uint128` without validation that they fit within the target type's range. ```solidity function bridgeOut(address _to, uint128 _gaslimit, uint256 _originalAmount, uint256 _minAmount) external payable nonReentrant { // ... code ... else { uint256 _totalDeposits = totalDeposits; pending[_totalDeposits].to = _to; pending[_totalDeposits].amount = uint128(_originalAmount); // Unchecked downcast pending[_totalDeposits].minAmount = uint128(_minAmount); // Unchecked downcast // ... rest of function } } ``` If either `_originalAmount` or `_minAmount` exceeds `type(uint128).max` (approximately 3.4 × 10^38), the values will silently wrap around to a much smaller number due to integer overflow. This could result in users unintentionally bridging significantly fewer tokens than intended, leading to a loss of funds without any explicit revert or warning.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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