Coinhound has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 5 May 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 8 low (8 open, 4 acknowledged).
All minted LP tokens are controlled by owner
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Incorrect Distribution Of Fees
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
If `buy` Fees Are Set To 0 Tokens May Not Be Able
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Any ETH Accidentally Sent To Contract May Be Dist
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Miscalculation For `maxTokenPerWallet`
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Reentrancy
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Solidity Version Not Recommended
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Too Many Digits
Coinhound · CertiK · 5 May 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coinhound | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | None open | Findings: 3 high · 1 medium · 8 low 4 acknowledged · 8 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 8 | 0 | 0 |
In the function `_transfer()`, the difference in the contracts ETH before and after the swap are not checked, causing any ETH that has accidentally been sent to the contract to be included in the distribution of fees.
Open the reportThe `amount` that is added to the balance of the `recipient` to check that it does not exceed the `maxTokenPerWallet` does not take into account the fees. If fee is taken on the transfer, then the amount transferred will be `amount - allFee` so that the transaction may fail stating that the `maxTokenPerWallet` was exceeded, when it will not be.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles. The following functions do not emit events: - `excludeFromFee()`; - `excludeFromMaxTokenPerWallet()`; - `migrateETH()`
Open the reportA reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. **We mark this as informational considering reentrancy is only possible if the development wallet is set as a contract that makes external calls** If the `developmentWallet` is set as a contract that makes an external call in its `fallback()` or `receive()` function, then when ether is transffered to the contract, the external call may be used in order to re-enter the contract. ### External call(s) ```solidity=221 payable(developmentWallet).transfer(developmentPart); ``` ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=223 swapping = false; ``` ```solidity=228 super._transfer(sender, recipient, amount); ``` * This function call executes the following assignment(s). * In `ERC20._transfer`, * `_balances[from] = fromBalance - amount` * In `ERC20._transfer`, * `_balances[to] += amount` ```solidity=235 super._transfer(sender, address(this), allFee); ``` * This function call executes the following assignment(s). * In `ERC20._transfer`, * `_balances[from] = fromBalance - amount` * In `ERC20._transfer`, * `_balances[to] += amount` *Note: Only a sample of 3 assignments (out of 4) are shown above.*
Open the reportThe contract `Coinhound` uses an old solidity version. ```solidity=20 pragma solidity 0.8.2; ```
Open the reportLiterals with many digits are difficult to read and review. ```solidity=87 maxTokenPerWallet = 5000000 * (10 ** 18); ``` --- ```solidity=88 maxTokenPerTxn = 10000000 * (10 ** 18); ``` --- ```solidity=89 swapTokensAtAmount = 100000 * (10 ** 18); ``` --- ```solidity=94 _mint(msg.sender, 1000000000 * (10 ** 18)); ```
Open the reportIn the function `_transfer()` the following checks are performed: ```solidity require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address"); require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address"); ``` However, it any case `super._transfer(sender, recipient, amount)` or `super._transfer(sender, recipient, amount - allFee)` will be called. The `_transfer()` function in Openzeppelin's `ERC20` contract preforms these checks making it unnecessary to check them again.
Open the reportIt is not recommended to use Solidity's `transfer()` and `send()` functions for transferring Ether, since some contracts may not be able to receive the funds. Those functions forward only a fixed amount of gas (2300 specifically) and the receiving contracts may run out of gas before finishing the transfer. Also, EVM instructions' gas costs may increase in the future. Thus, some contracts that can receive now may stop working in the future due to the gas limitation. The following lines use solidities `transfer()` function for transferring Ether. ```solidity=221 payable(developmentWallet).transfer(developmentPart); ``` ```solidity=277 recipient.transfer(address(this).balance); ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xec50…6da10xec505c81d6a7567b5bde804870b1038832fe6da1 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Coinhound, dated 5 May 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Coinhound”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Coinhound.
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 8 low (8 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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