CryptoChronic security record
As of 4 Nov 2026, CryptoChronic has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 29 Jun 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crypto Chronic | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings8
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 5 | 2 |
HighCentralization Related RisksCrypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
In the contract `Feeder` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to pause/resume functionalities of this contract, set the `Chronic` contract address, set the fertility price, withdraw ETH from the contract, renounce ownership, and transfer ownership to a new owner.  In the contract `Chronic` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and disable the craft, freeze URI, pause/resume the contract, set the `Breeder` contract address, set the `Feeder` contract address, set the freezer address, set the initial token value, set the base token URI, set the base image URI, set the base contract URI, craft NFT to anyone, renounce ownership, and transfer ownership to a new owner.  In the contract `Chronic` the role `freezerAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `freezerAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to `unfreezeToken` and `setOtherBCtokenId`.  In the contract `Breeder` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/resume the contract, set the `Chronic` contract address, set the breed price, set mint price, set fertility, set series, set layers, set layer value, set layer part, set weights, create CryptoChronicNFT, breed the gene, withdraw ETH from the contract, renounce ownership, and transfer ownership to a new owner. 
Open the reportLowMissing Emit EventsCrypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportLowMissing Zero Address ValidationCrypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses. ```solidity=1934 breederAddress = _breederAddress; ``` - `_breederAddress` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=1935 feederAddress = _feederAddress; ``` - `_feederAddress` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=1936 freezerAddress = _freezerAddress; ``` - `_freezerAddress` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportLowReusable `signature`Crypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
While the `mintWhitelistedChronic()` function requires a `signature` generated by the whitelist, it does not verify if the `signature` has been previously used. Consequently, the `signature` can be reused, enabling anyone to mint `Chronic` with `wlPrice` by utilizing the same `signature`.
Open the reportLowUnused Return ValueCrypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
The return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable. ```solidity=621 cc.mint(to, gene, 0, 0, fertility); ``` --- ```solidity=636 cc.mint(_msgSender(), gene, 0, 0, fertility); ```
Open the reportLowWeak PRNGCrypto Chronic · CertiK · 29 Jun 2023Acknowledged
Weak PRNG due to a modulo on `block.timestamp` and `block.difficulty`. These can be influenced by miners to some extent, so they should be avoided. ```solidity=691 return uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.difficulty, block.timestamp, (_initialNumber++)))) % number; ```
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Show this on your site
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Content
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
Style
Format
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="cryptochronic"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us