Cryptolegions has 4 public audit reports from SolidProof and CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 19 Sep 2022; no critical findings reported. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
56 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 12 high, 1 medium, 43 low (43 open, 13 acknowledged).
Centralization Risks in BeastNFT.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in BloodStone V3.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in CommonNFT.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in FeeHandler.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in LegionNFT.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in Monster.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in ReferralSystem.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in RewardPool.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in VRFConsumer.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in WarriorNFT.sol
Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ · CertiK · 19 Sep 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 18 high · 2 medium · 29 low 17 fixed · 13 acknowledged · 19 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| FIFADoge | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 10 low 10 open | IPFS ↗ |
| Crypto Legions Bloodstone | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: 2 addresses on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 7 low 7 open | IPFS ↗ |
| Cryptolegions | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: 2 addresses on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 7 low 7 open | IPFS ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 12 | 6 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Low | 43 | 0 | 10 |
Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false. ```solidity=146 require( checkCoolDownTime(tokenId) == true, 'Should not transfer legion during 30 days after previous tranfer' ); ``` --- ```solidity=236 require(isSunday() == true, '10'); ``` --- ```solidity=238 require(avail == true, '11'); ``` --- ```solidity=240 require(canHunt(tokenId) == true, '12'); ``` --- ```solidity=257 require(canHunt(tokenId) == true, '12'); ``` --- ```solidity=288 require(isSunday() == true, '17'); ``` --- ```solidity=290 require(avail == true, '18'); ``` --- ```solidity=119 uint8 length = isSunday() == true ? 25 : 24; ```
Open the reportThere are many hardcode addresses in this codebase.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportAddresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses. ```solidity=201 marketplace = _addr; ``` - `_addr` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=54 warriorNFTAddress = warrior; ``` - `warrior` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=260 beast = _beast; ``` - `_beast` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=261 warrior = _warrior; ``` - `_warrior` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=262 legion = _legion; ``` - `_legion` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=263 marketplace = _marketplace; ``` - `_marketplace` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportThe linked variables are assigned only once, either during their contract-level declaration or during the `constructor`'s execution.
Open the reportThe state variable `automatedMarketMakerPairs` may contain more than one Uniswap pair except for `lpPair`. So whether or not the pairs, except for `lpPair`, can be excluded from the max transaction by calling the function `excludeFromMaxTransaction()`?
Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on the slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by front running (before the transaction is attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (after the transaction is attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapBack()`
Open the reportThe linked function `approveBlst()` is called only by the contract `RewardPool` itself and only within the `setApproveToContracts()` function defined in `RewardPool.sol`. So the `approveBlst()` should be defined as internal function.
Open the reportThe linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either leftovers from test code or older functionality.
Open the reportComparisons that are always true or always false may be incorrect or unnecessary. ```solidity=111 require(_index >= 0 && _index < 8, 'Unknown fee type'); ```
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=10 IMarketPlace private constant oldMarketPlace = IMarketPlace(0x2D9446738C60338e5a6D0416108217B460d6D266); ``` - The contract `BeastNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IMarketPlace` interface via `oldMarketPlace`. --- ```solidity=18 IERC20 public bloodstone; ``` - The contract `CommonNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `bloodstone`. --- ```solidity=27 IVRFConsumer vrfConsumer; ``` - The contract `CommonNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IVRFConsumer` interface via `vrfConsumer`. --- ```solidity=98 IDEXRouter public router; ``` - The contract `FeeHandler` interacts with third party contract with `IDEXRouter` interface via `router`. --- ```solidity=18 IMarketPlace private constant oldMarketPlace = IMarketPlace(0x2D9446738C60338e5a6D0416108217B460d6D266); ``` - The contract `LegionNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IMarketPlace` interface via `oldMarketPlace`. --- ```solidity=23 IERC20 public BUSD = IERC20(0x78867BbEeF44f2326bF8DDd1941a4439382EF2A7); ``` - The contract `LegionNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `BUSD`. --- ```solidity=25 IUniswapV2Pair pair = IUniswapV2Pair(0xF7349a1d58e17A3dbf54ab8Fb30FB8F56D2eb700); // Should update it from Tris ``` - The contract `LegionNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Pair` interface via `pair`. --- ```solidity=17 IERC20 private bloodstone; ``` - The contract `Marketplace` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `bloodstone`. --- ```solidity=9 IERC20 private bloodstone; ``` - The contract `RewardPool` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `bloodstone`. --- ```solidity=9 VRFCoordinatorV2Interface COORDINATOR; ``` - The contract `VRFv2Consumer` interacts with third party contract with `VRFCoordinatorV2Interface` interface via `COORDINATOR`. --- ```solidity=11 IMarketPlace private constant oldMarketPlace = IMarketPlace(0x2D9446738C60338e5a6D0416108217B460d6D266); ``` - The contract `WarriorNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IMarketPlace` interface via `oldMarketPlace`. --- ```solidity=13 IReferralSystem referralSystem; ``` - The contract `WarriorNFT` interacts with third party contract with `IReferralSystem` interface via `referralSystem`.
Open the reportLiterals with many digits are difficult to read and review. ```solidity=55 bloodstone.approve(address(rewardPool), 5000000 * 10**18); ``` --- ```solidity=111 bloodstone.approve(_rewardpool, 5000000 * 10**18); ``` --- ```solidity=100 require(_price < 5000000 * 10**18, 'Price can not exceed the BLST total supply'); ``` --- ```solidity=125 require(_price < 5000000 * 10**18, 'Price can not exceed the BLST total supply'); ``` --- ```solidity=66 monsterData[13].reward = 1900000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=81 monsterData[18].reward = 3800000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=84 monsterData[19].reward = 4300000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=87 monsterData[20].reward = 4900000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=93 monsterData[22].reward = 23000000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=95 monsterData[23].attack_power = 300000; ``` --- ```solidity=96 monsterData[23].reward = 33000000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=98 monsterData[24].attack_power = 500000; ``` --- ```solidity=99 monsterData[24].reward = 150000000 * 10**14; ``` --- ```solidity=101 monsterData[25].attack_power = 500000; ``` --- ```solidity=102 monsterData[25].reward = 15000000; ``` --- ```solidity=90 bloodstone.approve(_beast, 5000000 * 1e18); ``` --- ```solidity=91 bloodstone.approve(_warrior, 5000000 * 1e18); ``` --- ```solidity=24 uint32 callbackGasLimit = 500000; ```
Open the reportThe function `address.call()` may return false if the transaction is failed, the local variable `success` should be checked and revert the transaction if failed.
Open the reportThe return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=39 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=172 bloodstone.transferFrom(address(rewardPool), msg.sender, executeAmount * tokenIds.length); ``` --- ```solidity=158 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=294 BUSD.transferFrom(msg.sender, liquidityPool, (reward * feehandler.getFee(1)) / 10000); ``` --- ```solidity=434 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=463 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=485 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ``` --- ```solidity=586 bloodstone.transferFrom(address(rewardPool), msg.sender, feehandler.getBLSTAmount(usdAmount * 10**18)); ``` --- ```solidity=67 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardpool), amountToRewardpool); ``` --- ```solidity=68 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, items[_itemType][_tokenId].seller, amountToSeller); ``` --- ```solidity=213 bloodstone.transfer(msg.sender, claimingAmountInBLST); ``` --- ```solidity=51 bloodstone.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(rewardPool), blstAmount); ```
Open the reportThe contracts have unlocked compiler version in this codebase. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
Open the reportThe return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable. ```solidity=55 bloodstone.approve(address(rewardPool), 5000000 * 10**18); ``` --- ```solidity=111 bloodstone.approve(_rewardpool, 5000000 * 10**18); ``` --- ```solidity=90 bloodstone.approve(_beast, 5000000 * 1e18); ``` --- ```solidity=91 bloodstone.approve(_warrior, 5000000 * 1e18); ```
Open the reportThe linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
Open the reportThe linked variables could be declared as `constant` since these state variables are never modified.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
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Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x3405…84ff0x340516b933597f131e827abdf0e3f700e24e84ff | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x4db1…58b50x4db14f4c369e6882076f2c95c8ed19a4891e58b5 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 4 public audit reports for Cryptolegions, dated 9 Mar 2022 to 19 Sep 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Crypto Legions - Addendum Ⅱ”).
2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for Cryptolegions: SolidProof and CertiK.
56 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 12 high, 1 medium, 43 low (43 open, 13 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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