As of 3 Nov 2026, DCOREUM has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 22 Feb 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCOREUM (DCO) - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 8 | 0 | 0 |
The total amount of the initial mint or `_totalSupply * 10 ** decimal()` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `_totalSupply * 10 ** decimal()` tokens without the consensus of the community. It is noted that the contract address of the `superAdminAddress` [0x6080b14E69157e8dcA7F28aB1CDbb48fd3777363](https://bscscan.com/address/0x6080b14E69157e8dcA7F28aB1CDbb48fd3777363) which the contracts from the initial mint are being sent to is a Gnosis Safe Proxy. Moreover, the Gnosis Safe Proxy only has one owner address: [0xD6Cf3A91A0ff9b7148D47E8Bd612508A811c07CF](https://bscscan.com/address/0xD6Cf3A91A0ff9b7148D47E8Bd612508A811c07CF).
Open the reportIn the contract `DCO` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below: * `excludeFromFees()` - Exclude certain addresses from the deduction of fees on token transfers * `setLpAddress()` - Set liquidity pool address Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to set the `lpAddress` or exclude addresses from fees.  In the contract `OwnableContract` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram and list below: * `setOwner()` - Set a new `owner` address and revoke access of original `owner` * `renounceOwnership()` - Revoke `owner` access without setting a new `owner` address Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to set owner or renounce ownership. 
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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