dHEDGE security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, dHEDGE has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 1 Dec 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| dHEDGE - Ⅳ | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings17
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 11 |
HighCentralization Risks in DhedgeStakingV2Storage.sodHEDGE - Ⅳ · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Acknowledged
In the contract `DhedgeStakingV2Storage` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change `maxVDurationTimeSeconds`, `dhtCap`, `rewardStreamingTime`, `tokenUriGenerator` and several attributes of RewardParams struct such as: `stakeDurationDelaySeconds`, `maxDurationBoostSeconds`, `maxPerformanceBoostNumerator`, `stakingRatio` and `emissionsRate`. Furthermore he can gain the ability to configure new pools. 
Open the reportHighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradedHEDGE - Ⅳ · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Acknowledged
Since `DhedgeStakingV2Storage` and `DhedgeStakingV2` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.
Open the reportMediumPotential Token Price ManipulationdHEDGE - Ⅳ · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Acknowledged
Since the implementation of `IPoolLogic.tokenPrice()` is unknown, it is not possible to rely on the value returned by that function. There is the possibility of price manipulations by attackers and thus all the operations involving this function call may be affected. For example: - An attacker manipulates the token price by lowering it considerably. - In `unstakePoolTokens()` the manipulated value is assigned to `tokenPriceFinish`. For example, consider a value lower than `stake.stakeStartTokenPrice`. - `stake.reward` is assigned the amount computed by `calculateDhtRewardAmount()`, which under these assumptions can always be forced to zero. This occurs if inside `calculateDhtRewardAmount()` the computed value of `performanceMultiplier` is zero, which happens when `tokenPriceFinish` is less than or equal to `tokenPriceStart`.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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