Diamante audit reports

Diamante has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Apr 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm4

Statuses are the security firms’ own

4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 low (all open).

Low
4
  • Low Open

    Insufficient Use of EIP712 and ECDSA in `mint()`

    Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Recover Address Signer Can Be Zero

    Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unnecessary Use of SafeMath

    Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Use of `abi.encodePacked`

    Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Diamante NetSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 4 low
4 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low400
LowInsufficient Use of EIP712 and ECDSA in `mint()`Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024Open

The `mint()` function in the `Diam` contract does not fully utilize the EIP712 standard and the ECDSA library already imported through the `ERC20Permit` inheritance, leading to potential signature malleability issues and a lack of distinction between signatures provided for the `mint()` and `permit()` functions. The `mint()` function should construct a structhash for the `mint()` function and use `ECDSA.recover()` for signature verification, similar to the methods used in `permit()` within `ERC20Permit`. An attacker could exploit the lack of signature malleability checks to forge signatures and mint tokens without authorization. The current implementation of the `mint()` function uses a manual construction of the message digest and `ecrecover` for signature verification. This approach lacks the security checks provided by `ECDSA.recover()` and does not fully employ methods recommended in [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712).

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LowRecover Address Signer Can Be ZeroDiamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024Open

The function `ecrecover()` can return zero, and this can lead to a vulnerability as the address of the signer is not checked properly. By default, this issue is impossible to happen because of the below validation, and the `owner()` will not be `address(0)` in the known blockchains. ```solidity=60 require(signer == owner(), "DW02"); ``` This finding is to remind that the team should check if `address(0)` account of the blockchain, on which the `Diam` contract will be deployed, is held by any user on that blockchain. If ownership is ever renounced however, minting is immediately vulnerable to anyone minting any value. This is not ideal because the likely intention behind renouncing ownership would be to make it impossible to mint more tokens.

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LowUnnecessary Use of SafeMathDiamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024Open

The `SafeMath` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow. ```solidity=9 using SafeMath for uint256; ``` - `SafeMath` library is used for `uint256` type in `Diam` contract.

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LowUse of `abi.encodePacked`Diamante Net · CertiK · 3 Apr 2024Open

As a general practice, use of `abi.encodePacked` is discouraged, since it is susceptible to hash collisions in some instances where dynamically-sized inputs are used consecutively.

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x1fa0f5ed24a1a2b43741e88f8fec19633e67082bChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

Diamante: questions

Is Diamante audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Diamante, dated 3 Apr 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Diamante Net”).

Who audited Diamante?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Diamante.

Are there open findings in Diamante’s audits?

4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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