DIGIKA security record
As of 28 Oct 2026, DIGIKA has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 27 Feb 2025. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DIGIKA - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings9
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 6 | 0 |
HighCentralization Risks in DGKToken.solDIGIKA - Audit · CertiK · 27 Feb 2025Open
In the contract `DGKToken`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set address fee exemption status, set or unset a minter status, remove an address from the blacklist, set the transaction fee, set the paused state, set the treasury wallet address, set the transaction cooldown, blacklist an address, and mint tokens to a specified address.  In the contract `DGKToken`, the role `isMinter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `isMinter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to a specified address.  In the contract `Lock`, the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw the contract balance if conditions are met.  In the contract `Ownable`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce the current ownership or transfer ownership to a new owner. 
Open the reportHighInitial Token DistributionDIGIKA - Audit · CertiK · 27 Feb 2025Open
Half of the max supply `DGK` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportContracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xf4445049080ae2fde75aaf0c6e603fb55875f02c | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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