Dora Factory security record

As of 21 Oct 2026, Dora Factory has 4 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Oak Security, dated 13 Jun 2024. Those reports list 1 critical acknowledged and not fixed. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
1 critical acknowledged, not fixed
Reported in “Dora Vota audit” by Oak Security, Jun 2024. The team acknowledged it. See the findings
Open the latest report
Your label, live
Get the label for your site

Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits4

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
Dora Vota auditSecurity firm: Oak SecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded (see the report)1 critical acknowledged, not fixedOpen · GitHub
DORA ERC20 Contract Update-AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on EthereumNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
Dora Grant DAO V4Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
Aptos Grant DAO-AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Not recorded (see the report)No open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings32

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical010
High251
Medium001
Low8212
CriticalInfinite gas allocated per block allows attackers to halt the chainDora Vota audit · Oak Security · 13 Jun 2024Acknowledged

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
HighInconsistency between evidence and staking parameters allows malicious validators to escape penaltiesDora Vota audit · Oak Security · 13 Jun 2024Acknowledged

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
HighOversized maximum block size could allow DoS attacksDora Vota audit · Oak Security · 13 Jun 2024Acknowledged

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
HighUsage of deprecated x/crisis module allows attackers to execute DoS attacksDora Vota audit · Oak Security · 13 Jun 2024Acknowledged

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionDORA ERC20 Contract Update-Audit · CertiK · 20 Aug 2023Acknowledged

All of the DORA tokens are sent to the `_founder` address. This is a centralization risk because the `_founder` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Open the report
HighCentralization Related RisksDora Grant DAO V4 · CertiK · 6 Mar 2023Acknowledged

In the contract `DoraChecker` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions: * setWhitelist() * freeze() * unFreeze() * slash() Any compromise to the `_owner` or access to the functions may allow a hacker to do the following: - put account to white list. The hacker could add his account to the white list which could allow him to get the slashed funds. - free or unfreeze user staking account. The hacker could use this authority to freeze user staking account and slash him. Or unfreeze bad accounts to let them get funds. - slash specific user staking account. The hacker could use this authority to slash some accounts and get their funds. --- In the contract `DoraChecker` the users on the `whitelist` have authority over the functions: * slashTo() Any compromise to the `whitelist` or access to the functions may allow a hacker to do the following: - get slashed funds. The hacker could use this authority to transfer slashed funds to any account. --- In the contract `StakingEntry` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions: * setAdmin() * addSigningKeys() Any compromise to the `_owner` or access to the functions may allow a hacker to do the following: - add signature information. The hacker could use this authority to forbidden specific accounts to use deposit function.

Open the report
LowFunction `approve` of Contract `ERC20` Does Not PDORA ERC20 Contract Update-Audit · CertiK · 20 Aug 2023Acknowledged

It is expected that calls of the form `approve(spender, amount)` fail if the address in `spender` is the zero address.

Open the report
LowFunction `transferFrom` of Contract `ERC20` DoesDORA ERC20 Contract Update-Audit · CertiK · 20 Aug 2023Acknowledged

It is expected that calls of the form `transferFrom(from, dest, amount)` fail if the `from` address is zero.

Open the report

Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x70b790d0948a760e80bc3f892b142f7779b538b2Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

Show this on your site

Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.

Content

Facts

Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.

Fixed as
Language

Style

Layout
Theme
Accent
Corners

Format

Size
Date
Embed as
HTML
<head>
<script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script>
</head>
<body>
<div
data-tb-project-widget
data-tb-project-slug="dora-factory"
></div>
</body>

Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us