As of 3 Nov 2026, Edain has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 3 May 2022. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edain-(Staking) | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Edain-(EdainAI) | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 6 | 6 |
In the contract `[EDAINToken]`, the role `[MINTER_ROLE]` has authority over the following functions: - mint() Any compromise to the `[MINTER_ROLE]` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to themselves or to anyone they please.
Open the reportAll of the [Edain] tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute [Edain] tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.
Open the reportThe return value of the global function `.transfer` in `_unstake()` is not handled. This is an issue because `_addressToStakedAmount[_validatorNode]` is set to `0` before the `transfer` function is called. Therefore the amount will be set 0 regardless if the `transfer` succeeds.
Open the reportAfter [EIP-1884](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1884) was included in the Istanbul hard fork, it is not recommended to use `.transfer()` or `.send()` for transferring ether as these functions have a hard-coded value for gas costs making them obsolete as they are forwarding a fixed amount of gas, specifically `2300`. This can cause issues in case the linked statements are meant to be able to transfer funds to other contracts instead of EOAs.
Open the reportOne or more declarations do not conform to the [Solidity style guide](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.3/style-guide.html#naming-conventions) with regards to its naming convention. Particularly: - `camelCase`: Should be applied to function names, argument names, local and state variable names, modifiers - `UPPER_CASE`: Should be applied to `constant` variables - `CapWords`: Should be applied to contract names, struct names, event names and enums File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/EDAINStaking.sol (Line 177, Function `EDAINStaking.hasStake`) ```solidity function hasStake(address _staker) ``` - Parameter `_staker` is not in `camelCase`. --- File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/EDAINStaking.sol (Line 55, Contract `EDAINStaking`) ```solidity function __EDAINStaking_init() public initializer { ``` - Function `__EDAINStaking_init` is not in `camelCase`. --- File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/EDAINToken.sol (Line 145, Function `EDAINToken.withdrawStake`) ```solidity function withdrawStake(uint256 amount, uint256 stake_index) external { ``` - Parameter `stake_index` is not in `camelCase`. --- File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/Migrations.sol (Line 6, Contract `Migrations`) ```solidity uint public last_completed_migration; ``` - Variable `last_completed_migration` is not in `camelCase`.
Open the reportMultiple Solidity versions are used in the codebase. Versions used: `^0.8.2`, `^0.8.0`, `^0.8.1`, `>=0.4.22<0.9.0` File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/EDAINToken.sol (Line 2) ```solidity pragma solidity ^0.8.2; ``` File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/introspection/IERC165Upgradeable.sol (Line 4) ```solidity pragma solidity ^0.8.0; ``` File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol (Line 4) ```solidity pragma solidity ^0.8.1; ``` File: projects/edain-smartcontracts/contracts/Migrations.sol (Line 2) ```solidity pragma solidity >=0.4.22 <0.9.0; ```
Open the reportPerforming integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation. In the `EDAINStaking.sol` contract the `currentReward` is calculated as follows, ```solidity uint256 _coinAge = (block.timestamp - _current_stake.timestamp).div( 1 days ); ``` ```solidity uint256 currentReward = _coinAge * interest * _current_stake.amount; ```
Open the reportThe contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to different compiler versions. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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