Everyworld security record

Ethereum, Polygon (POS)everyworld.io

As of 3 Nov 2026, Everyworld has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by Quantstamp, dated 5 May 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.

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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
EveryworldSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · certificate.quantstamp.com

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low003
LowIncompatibility Between Deployment Procedure and FxPortal Tunnel Implementation for ERC20 TransfersEveryworld · Quantstamp · 5 May 2023Fixed

The new token mapper utilizes the [FxPortal](https://wiki.polygon.technology/docs/develop/l1-l2-communication/fx-portal/) for ERC20 transfers. The client plans to use the default FxPortal tunnel implementation as there is no custom FXPortal implementation present in the codebase. Since the default FXPortal implementation is being used, the token needs to be minted on the Root chain first. Upon the first usage of the deposit function, the child contract is [created](https://github.com/0xPolygon/fx-portal/blob/main/contracts/examples/erc20-transfer/FxERC20RootTunnel.sol#L79) on the [child chain](https://github.com/0xPolygon/fx-portal/blob/main/contracts/examples/erc20-transfer/FxERC20RootTunnel.sol#L71-L93). Therefore, all tokens need to be minted on the root chain before transfers can occur. However, the deployment described in the `README.md` is incompatible with the procedure required for the default FxPortal tunnel implementation for ERC20 transfers.

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LowIncorrect Version of SolidityEveryworld · Quantstamp · 5 May 2023Fixed

An [important bug](https://blog.soliditylang.org/2022/09/08/storage-write-removal-before-conditional-termination/) was identified in Solidity `0.8.16`. This is the version being used by the contract in scope.

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LowRedundant Mint Address ValidationEveryworld · Quantstamp · 5 May 2023Fixed

During deployment of the `Token` contract, the addresses within `_mintAddresses` are validated to ensure the receiving address of the mint is not the zero address. This is redundant since `ERC20._mint()` already performs the same validation.

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