As of 3 Nov 2026, Fracton Protocol has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 30 Jan 2023. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fracton Protocol | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `FractonFFT` the role `IFractonTokenFactory(_factory).getDAOAddress()` has authority over the following functions: - `updateFee()` - `batchExcludeFromFee()` - `includeInFee()` - `excludeFromFee()` Any compromise to the `IFractonTokenFactory(_factory).getDAOAddress()` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and 1) Change the `vaultPercent` and `pfVaultPercent` variables, that decide the amount of tax deducted on transfer of tokens, by calling the `updateFee()` function. 2) Exempt multiple users at once from paying the tax by using the `batchExcludeFromFee()` function. 3) Include an exempted user to pay tax on transfer of tokens by using the `includeInFee()` function. 4) Exempt a user from the tax on transfer of tokens using the `excludeFromFee()` function. --- In the contract `FractonFFT` the role `IFractonTokenFactory(_factory).getSwapAddress()` has authority over the `swapmint()` function. Any compromise to the `IFractonTokenFactory(_factory).getSwapAddress()` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint as many tokens as they want and send them to any address.
Open the report1) The parameter `vaultPercent_` and `pfVaultPercent_` do not have an upper bound check. This means there is no upper bound on the tax that can be charged on a transfer of tokens. Moreover, the `transferFrom()` and `transfer()` function do not check if the tax deducted from the `value` is greater than the `value` itself or not. Since the tax does not have any upper limit, it is possible to have the `vaultFee` or `pfVaultFee` greater than the `value` being transferred. 2) In the function `multiTransfer()`, it is not checked if the length of the `receivers[]` array is equal to the length of the `amounts[]` array.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x7a83…13150x7a83ff237e7870d8d6c3485920ebe654d2841315 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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