As of 19 Nov 2026, Fragmetric Restaking Program has 4 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 8 Oct 2025. Those reports list 1 open critical finding.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fragmetric Liquid Restaking Program - 2 | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Fragmetric Liquid Restaking Program | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Fragmetric Restaking Program | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Fragmetric v1 Includes formal verification | Security firm: Certora | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 open critical finding | GitHub ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Low | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firms. Not counted as findings.
A fund manager can unilaterally and instantly update the state of a `FundAccount`. While this is likely for operational purposes, it may not be immediately obvious to users that this level of control is granted. This represents a significant trust assumption in the fund manager's operational security and integrity.
Open the reportThe protocol mints receipt tokens (e.g., fragSOL) at a 1:1 ratio when the first deposit occurs: ```rust let receipt_token_mint_amount = if self.receipt_token_mint.supply == 0 { // receipt_token_mint_amount will be equal to asset_amount at the initial minting, so like either 1SOL = 1RECEIPT-TOKEN or 1SUPPORTED-TOKEN = 1RECEIPT-TOKEN. asset_amount } else { pricing_service.get_asset_amount_as_token( supported_token_mint_key.as_ref(), asset_amount, &self.receipt_token_mint.key(), )? }; ``` If the first deposited asset has a different number of decimal places than the receipt token, this could result in an incorrect exchange rate. For example: - If the first deposit is a staked SOL variant with 6 decimal places, but fragSOL expects 9 decimal places, fragSOL would be valued 1000x more than SOL, distorting its price relative to the underlying basket. However, the protocol mitigates that by having a flag that enables and disables deposits, so the protocol can be the first depositor to prevent this exploit. <br> However, the protocol includes a deposit enable/disable flag, which allows it to control when user deposits can begin. This ensures that the protocol can act as the initial depositor, setting the correct exchange rate before external deposits occur, and preventing distortions in receipt token pricing.
Open the reportCurrently, the protocol relies on multiple pricing sources to fetch the price of the different assets it supports for deposits and withdrawals. Supported tokens that use Orca DEX as a pricing source retrieve the spot price instead of a time-weighted average price (TWAP). The configuration of the fund hedges volatility by doing the following: ```Price of FragJito = (JTO Price * JTO Reserve In fund) / FragJTO = JTO Price * K``` However, it should be noted that highly volatile tokens can be vulnerable to flash loan attacks to manipulate the spot price. Since only the JTO token uses the spot price and JTO is the only supported token for FragJTO, this is not currently a risk. The flash loan attack becomes viable if a supported token that uses a spot price is not the only token in a fund account.
Open the report1. In `user_fund_supported_token_context.rs`, function `deposit_supported_token()`, when emitting the event `UserDepositedSupportedTokenToFund`, it should be clarified if `fund_account` should be created with the values of `receipt_token_price` and `receipt_token_total_supply` before or after the deposit is recorded. 2. In `user_fund_context.rs`, function `deposit_sol()`, when emitting the event `UserDepositedSOLToFund`, it should be clarified if `fund_account` should be created with the values of `receipt_token_price` and `receipt_token_total_supply` before or after the deposit is recorded. 3. In `user_receipt_token_transfer_context.rs`, function `handle_transfer()`, when emitting the `UserTransferredReceiptToken`, it should be clarified if `source_fund_account` and `destination_fund_account` should use placeholders created with the address of the funds, or with the address of the underlying users. 4. In `operator_fund_context.rs`, function `process_fund_withdrawal_job()`, when emitting the event `OperatorProcessedJob`, it should be clarified if `fund_account` should be created with the values of `receipt_token_total_supply` before or after the withdrawal is recorded.
Open the reportIn `user_fund_context.rs`and the function `withdraw()`, if accounting discrepancies occur, no check prevents withdrawing all lamports from `fund_account`, which would result in the deletion of the account's data.
Open the reportThe protocol implements a withdrawal flow, where a user has to first request a withdrawal, through the `request_withdrawal()`, and then it has to be processed along with other withdrawal requests, if any. To process withdrawal requests, the operator needs to either wait for a pre-determined amount of time between each batch (`batch_processing_threshold_duration`), or a threshold amount (`batch_processing_threshold_amount`). This means that a user with a high stake, that is greater than `batch_processing_threshold_amount` can deposit and withdraw instantly.
Open the reportIn all but one case, the global `RewardPool` is always updated alongside the `UserRewardPool`. During deposits and withdrawals for instance. However, there is one case where a `UserRewardPool` will be updated without updating the `RewardPool` it is part of, namely this is the `update_user_reward_pools()` function that is callable by any user. There are no specific issues that are related to this case, but it might cause issues down the line if some future functionality expects the `UserRewardPool` and `RewardPool` to be updated together.
Open the reportThe protocol allows the deposit of a set of supported assets, or simply `SOL`, in exchange for `fragSol`. When users want to withdraw, they will get an amount of `SOL` that is equivalent to the `fragSol` value at the time of withdrawal. However, **there is no functionality for the admin to withdraw the supported tokens deposited by the users**. The protocol will not allow withdrawal at its first stage, which mitigates the risk that users might withdraw all the `SOL` deposited and leave the other supported tokens.
Open the reportThe functions `init_without_load()` and `bump()` access the value of `data` at a given `offset`. However, no check makes sure that `offset` is not an out-of-bound ID.
Open the reportThe closure `is_contribution_accrual_rate_valid` currently checks if the rate is invalid (i.e., not in the range `100..200`), so the closure name is misleading.
Open the reportThe protocol tracks `fragSol` transfers using a custom transfer hook. Currently, the feature is disabled, and transfers are not allowed. However, the transfer hook does not perform an allocation update for the source and the destination. This means if transfers were to be enabled, specifically in the function `UserReceiptTokenTransferContext.handle_transfer()` the balances and rewards of the source and destination will remain the same.
Open the reportAn underflow error can happen without explicit error if a user executes a transaction with `user_deposit_sol()` or `user_deposit_supported_token()` as the first instruction with `metadata`. In this case, the variable `current_ix_index` in the function `verify_preceding_ed25519_instruction()` will take the value `0`, and underflow will happen at the line: ``` let ix = instructions::load_instruction_at_checked(current_ix_index - 1, instructions_sysvar)?; ```
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe `admin_create_user_reward_account_idempotent` instruction provides a privileged admin with the ability to create a `UserRewardAccount` on behalf of any user. When this instruction is called, it hardcodes the `FUND_MANAGER_PUBKEY` as a delegate for the new account. This is a significant trust assumption in the protocol, as it grants the Fund Manager authority over the user's reward account without the user's direct signature for the delegation. This functionality is likely intended for administrative or onboarding purposes, but it implies that users must trust the Fund Manager not to misuse these delegated privileges (e.g., claiming rewards on their behalf).
Open the reportThere are three issues related to using the function `from_utf8_trim_null()` for the objects `RewardPool`, `Holder` and `Reward`. 1. There is a mismatch between the code and the spec for the function `from_utf8_trim_null()`, where the comment says: ``` /// Truncates null (0x0000) at the end. ``` But the function removes all `null` in `v`, not only at the end. 2. When objects mentioned above are initialized, the value of `name` or `description` is saved without being trimmed. However, what is returned by the functions `name()` and `description()` is trimmed. As a result, trimming is done `n` times instead of only once at initialization. Also, when calling `add_reward_pool()`, `add_holder()`, and `add_reward()`, the check of an existing item with the same name can be bypassed by using a name with added `null` chars. The values will differ, but once the object is added, the function `name()` will return the same value (trimmed) for both objects. 3. These objects can be created with an empty name or description.
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