Incident
Incident,
Source: De.Fi incident database.
- Audits before it
- 2.
- Audits since
- 2, the latest dated 22 Nov 2024.
Gala security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, Gala has 4 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 22 Nov 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain and 1 incident (latest 19 May 2024).
Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across the 4 reports, 2 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
Incident
Incident 19 May 2024
Source: De.Fi incident database. 2 audits have been published since. See the incident
Open the latest report
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Get the label for your siteRecord last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits4
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gala Games - TON Bridge | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | 1 critical finding, fixed | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Gala - Film | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Gala - governance voting API | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | 1 critical finding, fixed | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Gala Games - GalaV2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings37
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| High | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Low | 5 | 0 | 22 |
HighCentralization Related RisksGala Games - TON Bridge · CertiK · 22 Nov 2024Acknowledged
In the contracts `jetton_bridge`/`ton_coin_bridge` the role `owner_address` has authority over the functions - op::collect_fees - op::upgrade - op::change_fee Any compromise to the `owner_address` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - extract all the fees - change the contract code to extract all the locked funds - raise the fees to get all the bridged funds In the contract `bridge_gateway` the role `owner_address` has authority over the functions - op::register - op::upgrade Any compromise to the `owner_address` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - register a new fake bridge to perform a fake deposit and immediate extraction of all funds - change the contract code to extract all the locked funds
Open the reportIncidents1
Attached through a shared contract address. Our incident data ends in Oct 2026.
Contracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xacc36ebdc4b394f0b03ee2bbd1a6b701c0ab15cd | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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