Galileo security record

As of 3 Nov 2026, Galileo has 3 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by QuillAudits, dated 25 Dec 2024. Those reports list 1 open critical finding. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
1 open critical finding
Reported in “Galileo Protocol / GalileoStaking” by Hacken, Oct 2024. Not marked fixed in that report. See the findings
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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits3

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
Galileo ProtocolSecurity firm: QuillAuditsDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · quillaudits.com
Galileo Protocol / GalileoStakingSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: 1 address on Ethereum1 open critical findingOpen · hacken.io
Galileo Protocol / Marketplace + EscrowSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: 1 address on Ethereum2 open critical findingsOpen · hacken.io

Findings24

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical101
High004
Medium003
Low4011
CriticalMissing Reward Updates in unstake Function Results in Incorrect Reward CalculationsGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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HighconfigurePool Resets State and Causes Incorrect Reward CalculationsGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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HighLack of Dedicated Reward Pool Tracking Allows Reward Drainage from Other StakersGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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HighLack of End Time Validation in rewardPerToken Function Leads to Over-Accumulation of RewardsGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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HighUnstaking Function Does Not Enforce Staking Lock PeriodGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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MediumChain ID is not used in the signature, allowing replay attacks on other EVM chainsGalileo Protocol · QuillAudits · 25 Dec 2024Fixed

The _recover function uses EIP-712 typed data hashing to generate a digest for recovering the signer from a provided signature. However, the chain ID is not included in the hashed data. This omission allows the same signature to be reused (replayed) on other EVM-compatible chains that share the same contract address and data structure, potentially causing unintended actions.

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MediumStake function allows staking NFTs with token ID 0Galileo Protocol · QuillAudits · 25 Dec 2024Fixed

The _stakeTokens function allows users to stake NFTs with a token ID of 0. However, unstaking of token ID 0 is disallowed, leading to an inconsistency in the staking logic. If a user stakes a token with ID 0, they might face issues retrieving their NFT later, as the unstaking functionality does not account for this scenario

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MediumLack of Emergency Withdrawal MechanismGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

The report gives no description here.

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LowIncorrect comment in configureNewCollection regarding maxLeox validationGalileo Protocol · QuillAudits · 25 Dec 2024Fixed

The comment in the configureNewCollection function inaccurately describes the logic of the if block. Specifically, it states: // Ensure that maxLeox does not decrease compared to the previous tier However, the implementation actually enforces that maxLeox values must decrease (i.e., be in descending order) compared to the previous tier. This discrepancy between the comments and the logic leads to confusion, as it contradicts the intention verified in the written tests.

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LowNo check for emergency state in the _stakeTokens and stakeLeoxTokens functionsGalileo Protocol · QuillAudits · 25 Dec 2024Fixed

The current implementation of the stake and _stakeTokens functions does not verify whether an emergency state has been declared. If the contract is in an emergency state, allowing users to stake tokens may result in undesirable behavior, such as locking funds in an unsafe environment or exposing the protocol to additional risks. Adding a check to ensure that staking is not permitted during emergencies would enhance security and user protection.

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LowThe ‘already staked’ check can be bypassed in stakeLeoxTokens by passing tokenId as 0Galileo Protocol · QuillAudits · 25 Dec 2024Fixed

The stakeLeoxTokens function checks if the token is already staked by verifying the tokenId. However, this check can be bypassed by passing 0 as the tokenId. Since the tokenId field in the StakePerCitizen struct defaults to 0, the condition stakePerCitizen.tokenId != tokenId will evaluate as false, allowing the function logic to proceed. This creates an inconsistency and can potentially lead to staking logic being executed for an invalid token.

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LowImproper Handling of ERC-20 and ERC-721 Transfers Using Low-Level CallsGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowLack of Consistency Check for Staking Parameters in configureNewCollection Allows Incorrect Hierarchical Reward StructureGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowLack of Proper Event Indexing and Missing Events Limits Off-Chain Monitoring and TrackingGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowModifier Use for State Updates Lowers Code MaintainabilityGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowOverlapping Reward Windows Create Inconsistencies in the Staking SystemGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowRedundant Reward Calculation in withdrawAllRewards Leads to High Gas Costs and Potential DoSGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowRedundant State Variables and Unnecessary Assignments in updateEmissionRateGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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LowUnbounded Tax Rate in configurePool Allows Arbitrary Reward ManipulationGalileo Protocol / GalileoStaking · Hacken · 30 Oct 2024Fixed

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0xa444ec96ee01bb219a44b285de47bf33c3447ad5Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

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