Genius AI™ security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, Genius AI™ has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 19 Dec 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Genius - Audit #2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings22
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Low | 9 | 0 | 7 |
LowArbitrary external callsGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
The function `proofOfExodus()` executes an external call `IGeneral(callbackContract).exodus(msg.sender, balance, miners)`, where the address `callbackContract` is controlled by the caller and there is no input validation in place. A user can deploy a malicious `callbackContract` and perform arbitrary actions in the function `IGeneral.exodus()`.
Open the reportLowCalculations of `store.newInflation` And `store.rGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
In functions `_summarize10Days()`, `_summarize100Days()`, the variables `newInflation` and `redistribution` are accumulated. However, in `_summarize1000Days()`, the variables are reset for each loop iteration. ```solidity newInflation = 0; redistribution = 0; ```
Open the reportLowCalculations With `netPrincipalPayout` In `_managGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
In `_manageCollateralMinerPayouts()`, the mint value is `netPrincipalPayout + netRewardsPayout`. `netRewardsPayout` is decreased from `calendar.burnedSupply` afterward. Our understanding is that the reason for the decrease is that `netRewardsPayout` is minted. On the other hand, as the other value minted, `netPrincipalPayout` is not deducted from anywhere.
Open the reportLowImplicit 0.01% burn when outbidGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
When a user outbids the highest bidder in the auction, as implemented in `_handleAuctionOutBid`, the highest bidder will get 99.99% of the amount instead of the entire amount returned.
Open the reportLowIncompatibility with Deflationary TokensGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
When transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction.
Open the reportLowInconsistency Function Access in CalendarGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
1. `decreaseBurnedSupply()`: the `auctionAddress` has access in the implementation but not mentioned in the comments. 2. `increaseBurnedSupply()`: the `hexodusAddress` has access in the implementation but not mentioned in the comments. 3. `incDailyPenalties()`: the `auctionAddress` has access in the implementation but not mentioned in the comments.
Open the reportLowRisk For Weak RandomnessGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
It is now well understood that the difficulty or timestamp is not a source of randomness. They can be manipulated if the attacker is also a miner. For EVM compatible blockchains such as Binance smart chain and Polygon, the `block.difficulty` can be the same value across multiple blocks, making the situation even worse.
Open the reportLowThe input `bid` is not used for the action's `firGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
For the first bid, the actual amount burned in `_geniusContract` is `auction.firstBid` but not the input `bid`.
Open the reportLowUser-Defined GettersGenius - Audit #2 · CertiK · 19 Dec 2022Open
The linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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