GrabCoinClub security record

Ethereum, Polygon (POS)grabcoinclub.comGitHub

As of 3 Nov 2026, GrabCoinClub has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 12 Oct 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.

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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
GrabCoinClubSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium000
Low701
HighCentralization Related RisksGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

In the contract `GrabCoinClub` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and unlock a series, set properties, set signer, set admin, set wallet, and withdraw tokens or ether from this contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/9222feb6424f4d2885edadf677920afd/diagrams/centralization_GrabCoinClub-GrabCoinClub-_owner.svg) In the contract `GrabCoinClub` the role `admin` has authority over the following functions. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint NFT. - mintAdmin() - mintAirdrop() In the contract `Dividends` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change contract state addresses which would drastically affect network interactions. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/bd6bb857d5ec4bb8a088e51f9369fb9b/diagrams/centralization_Dividends-Dividends-_owner.svg)

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HighInitial Token DistributionGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

All of the 6,000,000,000 ether tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute all tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

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Low`msg.value` Not Check on Receiving EtherGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

When purchasing with Ether, there is no check to guarantee the appropriate amount was sent by the caller.

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LowIncorrect Error MessageGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

The following message does not describe the error correctly. ```solidity=236 require(0 < balance, "ERC721Enumerable: owner index out of bounds"); ```

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LowLack of Sanity CheckGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

The function `_sendErc20()` is missing a sanity check to ensure the parameter `tokenAddress` is a contract. If the `tokenAddress` is an EOA, the function call `tokenAddress.call()` will always return true.

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LowMissing Emit EventsGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

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LowMissing IPFS CheckGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

The function doesn't verify if the supplied `contractURI` or `baseURI` is a valid IPFS location.

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LowPotential Cross-chain Replay AttackGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

Within the current contract, there is no distinction between the different blockchains supported by `GrabCoinClub`. If the signer signed a message on one chain (e.g. Ethereum), and accidentally leaks the message, the message would be valid for a similar transaction of a chain with the same encryption method (e.g. BSC). For example, if the signer signed a message (wallet_, series_, quantity_, tokenAddress_, amount_, nonce_) on Ethereum and the same wallet_, tokenAddress_ exists on BSC. The attacker can reuse this signed message to mint NFT on BSC.

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LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` CaGrabCoinClub · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022Open

The return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=76 _token.transfer(msg.sender, (total * 10**_token.decimals()) / 10); ``` --- ```solidity=175 IERC20(tokenAddress_).transferFrom(from_, address(this), amount_); ```

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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