Grizzly.fi has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 30 Nov 2022; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 6 low (all open).
Centralization Related Risks
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Comparison to Boolean Constant
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Declaration Naming Convention
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Potential Incompatibility with Deflationary Token
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Third Party Dependency
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Uninitialized Local Variable
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Unused Return Value
Grizzly.fi 2 · CertiK · 30 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grizzly.fi 2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 1 high · 14 low 8 fixed · 7 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 6 | 0 | 8 |
In the contract BaseStrategy.sol the role `governance` has authority over the following functions: - function setHealthCheck() - function setDoHealthCheck() - function setStrategist() - function setKeeper() - function setMinReportDelay() - function setMaxReportDelay() - function setProfitFactor() - function setDebtThreshold() - function setMetadataURI() - function tend() - function harvest() - function setEmergencyExit() - function sweep() Any compromise to the `governance` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract BaseStrategy.sol the role `strategist` has authority over the following functions: - function setStrategist() - function setKeeper() - function setRewards() - function setMinReportDelay() - function setMaxReportDelay() - function setProfitFactor() - function setDebtThreshold() - function setMetadataURI() - function tend() - function harvest() - function setEmergencyExit() Any compromise to the `strategist` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract BaseStrategy.sol the role `vault.guardian` has authority over the following functions: - function tend() - function harvest() - function setEmergencyExit() Any compromise to the `guardian` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract BaseStrategy.sol the role `vault.management` has authority over the following functions: - function setProfitFactor() - function setDebtThreshold() - function tend() - function harvest() - function setEmergencyExit() Any compromise to the `management` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract BaseStrategy.sol the role `keeper` has authority over the following functions: - function tend() - function harvest() Any compromise to the `keeper` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvex3Crv.sol the role `governance` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setOptimal() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function updateRewards() Any compromise to the `governance` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvex3Crv.sol the role `vault.management` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setOptimal() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() Any compromise to the `vault.management` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexIB.sol the role `governance` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function updateRewards() - function setUniFees() Any compromise to the `governance` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexIB.sol the role `vault.management` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function setUniFees() Any compromise to the `vault.management` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexsBTC.sol the role `governance` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function updateRewards() - function setUniFees() Any compromise to the `governance` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexsBTC.sol the role `vault.management` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function setUniFees() Any compromise to the `vault.management` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexstETH.sol the role `governance` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() - function updateRewards() Any compromise to the `governance` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract StrategyConvexstETH.sol the role `vault.management` has authority over the following functions: - function withdrawToConvexDepositTokens() - function setClaimRewards() - function setForceHarvestTriggerOnce() - function setHarvestTriggerParams() Any compromise to the `vault.management` account may allow a hacker to take adva
Open the reportBoolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.
Open the reportThe linked declarations do not conform to the [Solidity style guide](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.3/style-guide.html#naming-conventions) with regards to its naming convention. Particularly: - `camelCase`: Should be applied to function names, argument names, local and state variable names, modifiers - `UPPER_CASE`: Should be applied to `constant` variables - `CapWords`: Should be applied to contract names, struct names, event names and enums
Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=89 _pullTokens(gVault, amountIn); ``` - Transferring tokens by `amountIn`. - This function call executes the following operation. - In `ZapOutBase._pullTokens`, - `IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);` ```solidity=92 uint256 underlyingTokenReceived = _vaultWithdraw( gVault, amountIn, underlyingToken ); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `ZapOutCurveGVault._vaultWithdraw`, - `IVault(fromVault).withdraw(amount, address(this), 10, msg.sender);` - Note: `withdraw` is an external function and its behavior wasn't evaluated. - The `amountIn` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.
Open the reportThe highlighted state variables are not properly initialized.
Open the reportThe return value of the highlighted function calls is not stored in a local or state variable.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Grizzly.fi, dated 30 Nov 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Grizzly.fi 2”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Grizzly.fi.
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 6 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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