Grok 1.5 audit reports

BNB Chaingrok-1-5.com

Grok 1.5 has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 6 May 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm11

Statuses are the security firms’ own

11 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 10 low (all open).

High
1
Low
10
  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion On The Gas Used In `internalSwap`

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Hardcode Address

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack Of Reverse Functions

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack of validation for `newPair` Address

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Not check the allowance

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Sandwich Attacks

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    State Variable Should Be Declared Constant

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unused Interface

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unused Return Value

    Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024 · Report ↗

All 11 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Grok 1.5 - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNone openFindings: 2 high · 10 low
1 fixed · 11 open
Original removed

Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium000
Low1000
HighInitial Token DistributionGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

All of the `Grok1.5` tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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LowDiscussion On The Gas Used In `internalSwap`Grok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

In the `Grok` contract, once the balance exceeds a certain threshold, some tokens are converted into native tokens and sent to `marketingAddress` and `devWallet`. The call to transfer these native tokens attaches 35,000 gas. ```solidity=432 if(mktAmount > 0) (success,) = marketingAddress.call{value: mktAmount, gas: 35000}(""); if(devAmount > 0) (success,) = devWallet.call{value: devAmount, gas: 35000}(""); ``` Typically, a straightforward native token transfer doesn't require such a large amount of gas. However, if `marketingAddress` and `devWallet` are contracts, the additional gas attached possibly enables them to execute operations within their `receive` function to make a recursive call back to the original function. We hope the team will share their thoughts on the design philosophy behind this part.

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LowHardcode AddressGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

There are some hardcode addresses in this codebase. If not configured properly, this can cause side effects on the contract.

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LowLack Of Reverse FunctionsGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The `enableTrading` function allows the admin to enable the trading by setting `isTradingEnabled` to true. ```solidity=444 function enableTrading() external onlyOwner { require(!isTradingEnabled, "Trading already enabled"); isTradingEnabled = true; emit _enableTrading(); } ``` However, there is no reverse function to disable the trading by setting `isTradingEnabled` to false. The `changeLpPair` function also has a similar problem. It allows `isLpPair[newPair]` to be set to true, but lacks a corresponding function to revert `isLpPair` to false once a pair has been marked as true. ```solidity=310 function changeLpPair(address newPair) external onlyOwner { isLpPair[newPair] = true; emit _changePair(newPair); } ``` This can lead to issues if the owner accidentally changes the value, potentially impacting the contract's operations.

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LowLack of validation for `newPair` AddressGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The `changeLpPair` is designed to allow the owner to update the `isLpPair` mapping, making the new LP pair address as true. ```solidity=310 function changeLpPair(address newPair) external onlyOwner { isLpPair[newPair] = true; emit _changePair(newPair); } ``` However, it's worth noting that the function lacks a verification mechanism to confirm the validity of the provided LP pair address as an actual LP pair for the token.

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LowNot check the allowanceGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The `transferFrom()` reduce the allowance directly without checking the allowance.

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LowPotential Sandwich AttacksGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `addLiquidityETH()`

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LowState Variable Should Be Declared ConstantGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

State variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=189 uint256 private buyAllocation = 40; ``` - `buyAllocation` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=190 uint256 private sellAllocation = 40; ``` - `sellAllocation` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=191 uint256 private liquidityAllocation = 20; ``` - `liquidityAllocation` should be declared `constant`.

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LowUnused InterfaceGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The smart contract contains one or more inteface definitions that are not used, which can lead to unnecessary complexity and reduced maintainability. ```solidity=70 interface IV2Pair { ``` - `IV2Pair` is declared but never used.

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LowUnused Return ValueGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The smart contract does not check or store the return value of an external call in a local or state variable, which may introduce vulnerabilities due to the unhandled outcome. ```solidity=396 try swapRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: newBalance}( address(this), secondMath, 0, 0, DEAD, block.timestamp ){} catch {return;} ```

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LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableGrok 1.5 - Audit · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

Open the report

Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0xdf67abeae37266dd6369a5c657cea2c197e64ca4Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Grok 1.5: questions

Is Grok 1.5 audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Grok 1.5, dated 6 May 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Grok 1.5 - Audit”).

Who audited Grok 1.5?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Grok 1.5.

Are there open findings in Grok 1.5’s audits?

11 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 10 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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