Grok X audit reports

BNB Chaingrokxbsc.vip

Grok X has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 20 Dec 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm10

Statuses are the security firms’ own

10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 8 low (all open).

High
2
Low
8
  • High Open

    Centralization Risks in GROKX.sol

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    All the Fees transferred to the `markert` address

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion on the `deadline` and `launchtax`

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Function `transfer` of Contract `GROKX` Handles S

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Function `transferFrom` of Contract `GROKX` Modif

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Hardcoded Addresses

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Sandwich Attacks

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` Ca

    Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Grok X - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNone openFindings: 2 high · 8 low
10 open
Original removed

Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low800
HighCentralization Risks in GROKX.solGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

In the contract `GROKX` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to change the market address and send tokens in the contract to the contract owner. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-97d9-ca05cfe0-ad02-ddeeb290953d/diagrams/centralization_GROKX-GROKX-_owner.svg) In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to transfer ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-97d9-ca05cfe0-ad02-ddeeb290953d/diagrams/centralization_GROKX-Ownable-_owner.svg)

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HighInitial Token DistributionGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

All of the `Grok X` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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LowAll the Fees transferred to the `markert` addressGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

The `_transfer()` function in the contract includes a fee charging mechanism. These fees are stored within the contract. Once the accumulated fees reach the `tokenLiquidityThreshold`, the main logic of the `Liquify` is triggered. At this point, the accumulated fees are distributed to both the liquidity pool and the market address based on the predetermined `swapTaxes`. The `swapTaxes` could be one of `taxes` and `sellTaxes`, which are initialized during deployment and remain unchanged thereafter. It is important to note that both the `liquidity` of taxes and sellTaxes are set to 0. This indicates that no tokens will be transferred to the liquidity pool, and instead, all the accumulated fees will be transferred to the market address. In addition, using the data from the latest transaction to determine the allocation of the accumulated fee is not suitable or appropriate. We would like to confirm with the team if it aligned with the original design.

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LowDiscussion on the `deadline` and `launchtax`Grok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

If the `deadline` value is zero, the `useLaunchFee` variable will always be false because `block.number` is always greater than or equal to the `genesis_block`. The default value of `deadline` is zero and can only be modified before the `openTrade()` function is called. Even if a positive value is set for `deadline` and `useLaunchFee` is true, the fee will still be zero because the `launchTax` is also zero. Therefore, this mechanism is unable to effectively prevent bots from front-running. We would like to confirm with the team if it aligned with the original design.

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LowFunction `transfer` of Contract `GROKX` Handles SGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

It is expected that non-reverting invocations of `transfer(recipient, amount)` that return `true` and where the address in `recipient` equals the address of `msg.sender` (i.e. self-transfers) do not change the balance of address `msg.sender`. However, in `GROKX.transfer` the balance of address `msg.sender` is changed by executing a self-transfer.

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LowFunction `transferFrom` of Contract `GROKX` ModifGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

It is expected that non-reverting invocations of `transferFrom(from, dest, amount)` that return `true` and where the address in `from` equals the address in `dest` (i.e. self-transfers) do not change the balance entry of the address in `from` (which equals `dest`). However, in `GROKX.transferFrom`, at least one balance entry of the addresses provided in the `from` or `dest` input parameters is changed when executing a self-transfer.

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LowHardcoded AddressesGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

There are many hardcoded addresses in current contract. Please ensure these addresses are configured correctly when deploying.

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LowPotential Sandwich AttacksGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens - router.addLiquidityETH

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsageGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=444 IRouter public router; ``` - The contract `GROKX` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter` interface via `router`.

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LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` CaGrok X - Audit · CertiK · 20 Dec 2023Open

The return values of the `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` calls in the smart contract are not checked. Some ERC-20 tokens' transfer functions return no values, while others return a bool value, they should be handled with care. If a function returns `false` instead of reverting upon failure, an unchecked failed transfer could be mistakenly considered successful in the contract. ```solidity=723 IERC20(tokenAdd).transfer(owner(), amount); ```

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0xa7ffb399d44eb830f01751052c75d14f0b47e779Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Grok X: questions

Is Grok X audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Grok X, dated 20 Dec 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Grok X - Audit”).

Who audited Grok X?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Grok X.

Are there open findings in Grok X’s audits?

10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 8 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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