GROK CEO has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 24 Jan 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (all open).
Initial Token Distribution
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Setting Automated Market Maker Pair with Correct
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Some ETH May Reserved in the Contract
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Discussion On the `ExemptFee`
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Lack Of Anti-Whale Mechanism
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Zero Address Validation
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
No Liquidity Supplying Mechanism
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
No Slippage Check
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Purchasing Tokens from New Pairs May Be Tax-Free
Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grok CEO - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 medium · 12 low 1 fixed · 15 open | Original removed |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 12 | 0 | 0 |
All of the GROKCEO tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportThe `setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function is designed to set the automated market maker pair, but it mistakenly passes the `pair` parameter instead of `lpPair` to the `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function. Consequently, this leads to incorrect updates of the automated market maker pair. ```solidity=1012 function setAutomatedMarketMakerPair( address lpPair, bool value ) external onlyOwner { require( pair != lpPair, "The pair cannot be removed from automatedMarketMakerPairs" ); _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` Similarly, due to the same issue, the `automatedMarketMakerPairs[lpPair]` should be updated instead of `automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair]`. ```solidity=1024 function _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address lpPair, bool value) private { automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair] = value; exemptFee[lpPair] = true; emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` Additionally, the event uses the incorrect parameter `pair` instead of `lpPair`. ```solditiy=1027 emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); ```
Open the reportThe `marketingTaxRatio` and `developingTaxRatio` are computed using the total tokens in the contract. However, when distributing rewards to the `marketing` and `developing`, the code utilizes the `remainingETH`, which represents the entire contract balance after deducting the `buybackToken`. ```solidity=977 uint256 remaningTokens = contractTokenBalance - buybackTokens; _swapTokensForBNB(remaningTokens); uint256 remainingEth = address(this).balance; uint256 marketingEth = (remainingEth * marketingTaxRatio) / 100; uint256 developingEth = (remainingEth * developingTaxRatio) / 100; ``` This may lead to some ETH reserved in the contract. For instance, considering current tax ratios of 2.4%, 1%, and 1.6%, the calculations yield `marketingTaxRatio`, `buybackTaxRatio`, and `developingTaxRatio` values of 48%, 20%, and 32% respectively. Assuming there are tokens equivalent to 100 ETH for distribution, about 20 ETH worth of tokens will be sent to the dead wallet. After a swap, the `remainingEth` is 80 ETH. Computed using the formula, the `marketingEth` and `developingEth` are 38ETH and 25ETH respectively. However, the total (`20 + 25 + 38`) is 83, which does not match the expected 100. Consequently, approximately 17 ETHs are retained in the contract in this scenario. Indeed, the leftover ETH within the contract can be moved to the marketing address through the execution of the `rescueBNB` function. ```solidity=904 function rescueBNB() external { address payable marketingAddress = payable(marketing); marketingAddress.transfer(address(this).balance); } ```
Open the reportIn the constructor, the variables `developing` and `marketing` are not explicitly initialized At L891-L892 and, by default, have a value of zero address. At lines 891-892, they are exempted from fees based on the fact that they both have zero addresses, resulting in `exemptFee[address(0)] = true`. ```solidity=891 exemptFee[developing] = true; exemptFee[marketing] = true; ``` The functions `changeMarketingWallet` and `changeDeveloperWallet` are responsible for changing the addresses of the `marketing` and `developing` variables, respectively. However, these functions do not automatically exempt the new addresses from fees. If you use the mentioned functions to change the addresses, you may need to ensure that the new addresses are explicitly exempted from fees if desired. ```solidity=993 function changeMarketingWallet(address _marketing) external onlyOwner { marketing = _marketing; } function changeDeveloperWallet(address _developer) external onlyOwner { developing = _developer; } ```
Open the reportThe contract does not have an **anti-whale** mechanism that consists of limiting the number of tokens that can be bought or sold on a single transaction. We would like to confirm with the team if it aligned with the original design.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportAddresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=994 marketing = _marketing; ``` - `_marketing` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=998 developing = _developer; ``` - `_developer` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportIn the function `distributeTaxes()`, the 20% balance of the `GROKCEO` tokens will be transferred to the dead wallet, the other `GROKCEO` tokens in this contract are swapped for `BNB`, then 80% BNB will be transferred to the wallet and the development address. There is no logic to liquefy tokens in this function `_swapTokensForBNB()`. ```solidity=979 _swapTokensForBNB(remaningTokens); uint256 remainingEth = address(this).balance; uint256 marketingEth = (remainingEth * marketingTaxRatio) / 100; uint256 developingEth = (remainingEth * developingTaxRatio) / 100; if (marketingTaxRatio > 0) { sendBNB(marketing, marketingEth); } if (developingTaxRatio > 0) { sendBNB(developing, developingEth); } ``` This can lead to risks related to price instability and price manipulation when there is insufficient liquidity in the pair liquidity pool.
Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset.
Open the reportThe `automatedMarketMakerPairs` function is used to mark whether an address is a `pair` or not. ```solidity= 1024 function _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address lpPair, bool value) private { automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair] = value; exemptFee[lpPair] = true; emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` However, the `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function both sets the `pair` and exempts the `pair` from fees. This could potentially result in users being exempt from taxes when buying or selling tokens through the new `pair`. We would like to confirm with the team whether this is aligned with the original design.
Open the reportThe allowance is approved to the router based on the token swapping amount in the `_swapTokensForBNB` function. Therefore, approving the maximum allowance to the router is redundant and unnecessary. ```solidity=1030 function _swapTokensForBNB(uint256 tokenAmount) private { _approve(address(this), address(router), tokenAmount); address[] memory path = new address[](2); path[0] = address(this); path[1] = router.WETH(); // WETH is BNB in bsc try router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp ) {} catch {} } ``` ```solidity=888 _approve(address(this), address(router), type(uint256).max); ```
Open the reportThe linked code were declared but never used.
Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=855 uint256 feeDenominator = 10000; ``` - `feeDenominator` should be declared `constant`.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=843 IRouter public router; ``` - The contract `GROKCEO` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter` interface via `router`.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x6294…ee290x6294deb10817e47a4ee6869db59c85f3ef4bee29 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for GROK CEO, dated 24 Jan 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Grok CEO - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for GROK CEO.
15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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