GROK CEO audit reports

BNB Chaingrokceo.ai

GROK CEO has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 24 Jan 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm15

Statuses are the security firms’ own

15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (all open).

High
1
Medium
2
Low
12
  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Setting Automated Market Maker Pair with Correct

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Some ETH May Reserved in the Contract

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Discussion On the `ExemptFee`

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack Of Anti-Whale Mechanism

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Emit Events

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Zero Address Validation

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    No Liquidity Supplying Mechanism

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    No Slippage Check

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Purchasing Tokens from New Pairs May Be Tax-Free

    Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024 · Report ↗

All 15 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Grok CEO - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNone openFindings: 2 high · 2 medium · 12 low
1 fixed · 15 open
Original removed

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High101
Medium200
Low1200
HighInitial Token DistributionGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

All of the GROKCEO tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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MediumSetting Automated Market Maker Pair with CorrectGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The `setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function is designed to set the automated market maker pair, but it mistakenly passes the `pair` parameter instead of `lpPair` to the `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function. Consequently, this leads to incorrect updates of the automated market maker pair. ```solidity=1012 function setAutomatedMarketMakerPair( address lpPair, bool value ) external onlyOwner { require( pair != lpPair, "The pair cannot be removed from automatedMarketMakerPairs" ); _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` Similarly, due to the same issue, the `automatedMarketMakerPairs[lpPair]` should be updated instead of `automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair]`. ```solidity=1024 function _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address lpPair, bool value) private { automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair] = value; exemptFee[lpPair] = true; emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` Additionally, the event uses the incorrect parameter `pair` instead of `lpPair`. ```solditiy=1027 emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); ```

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MediumSome ETH May Reserved in the ContractGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The `marketingTaxRatio` and `developingTaxRatio` are computed using the total tokens in the contract. However, when distributing rewards to the `marketing` and `developing`, the code utilizes the `remainingETH`, which represents the entire contract balance after deducting the `buybackToken`. ```solidity=977 uint256 remaningTokens = contractTokenBalance - buybackTokens; _swapTokensForBNB(remaningTokens); uint256 remainingEth = address(this).balance; uint256 marketingEth = (remainingEth * marketingTaxRatio) / 100; uint256 developingEth = (remainingEth * developingTaxRatio) / 100; ``` This may lead to some ETH reserved in the contract. For instance, considering current tax ratios of 2.4%, 1%, and 1.6%, the calculations yield `marketingTaxRatio`, `buybackTaxRatio`, and `developingTaxRatio` values of 48%, 20%, and 32% respectively. Assuming there are tokens equivalent to 100 ETH for distribution, about 20 ETH worth of tokens will be sent to the dead wallet. After a swap, the `remainingEth` is 80 ETH. Computed using the formula, the `marketingEth` and `developingEth` are 38ETH and 25ETH respectively. However, the total (`20 + 25 + 38`) is 83, which does not match the expected 100. Consequently, approximately 17 ETHs are retained in the contract in this scenario. Indeed, the leftover ETH within the contract can be moved to the marketing address through the execution of the `rescueBNB` function. ```solidity=904 function rescueBNB() external { address payable marketingAddress = payable(marketing); marketingAddress.transfer(address(this).balance); } ```

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LowDiscussion On the `ExemptFee`Grok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

In the constructor, the variables `developing` and `marketing` are not explicitly initialized At L891-L892 and, by default, have a value of zero address. At lines 891-892, they are exempted from fees based on the fact that they both have zero addresses, resulting in `exemptFee[address(0)] = true`. ```solidity=891 exemptFee[developing] = true; exemptFee[marketing] = true; ``` The functions `changeMarketingWallet` and `changeDeveloperWallet` are responsible for changing the addresses of the `marketing` and `developing` variables, respectively. However, these functions do not automatically exempt the new addresses from fees. If you use the mentioned functions to change the addresses, you may need to ensure that the new addresses are explicitly exempted from fees if desired. ```solidity=993 function changeMarketingWallet(address _marketing) external onlyOwner { marketing = _marketing; } function changeDeveloperWallet(address _developer) external onlyOwner { developing = _developer; } ```

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LowLack Of Anti-Whale MechanismGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The contract does not have an **anti-whale** mechanism that consists of limiting the number of tokens that can be bought or sold on a single transaction. We would like to confirm with the team if it aligned with the original design.

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LowMissing Emit EventsGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

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LowMissing Zero Address ValidationGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=994 marketing = _marketing; ``` - `_marketing` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=998 developing = _developer; ``` - `_developer` is not zero-checked before being used.

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LowNo Liquidity Supplying MechanismGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

In the function `distributeTaxes()`, the 20% balance of the `GROKCEO` tokens will be transferred to the dead wallet, the other `GROKCEO` tokens in this contract are swapped for `BNB`, then 80% BNB will be transferred to the wallet and the development address. There is no logic to liquefy tokens in this function `_swapTokensForBNB()`. ```solidity=979 _swapTokensForBNB(remaningTokens); uint256 remainingEth = address(this).balance; uint256 marketingEth = (remainingEth * marketingTaxRatio) / 100; uint256 developingEth = (remainingEth * developingTaxRatio) / 100; if (marketingTaxRatio > 0) { sendBNB(marketing, marketingEth); } if (developingTaxRatio > 0) { sendBNB(developing, developingEth); } ``` This can lead to risks related to price instability and price manipulation when there is insufficient liquidity in the pair liquidity pool.

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LowNo Slippage CheckGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

A sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset.

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LowPurchasing Tokens from New Pairs May Be Tax-FreeGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The `automatedMarketMakerPairs` function is used to mark whether an address is a `pair` or not. ```solidity= 1024 function _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address lpPair, bool value) private { automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair] = value; exemptFee[lpPair] = true; emit SetAutomatedMarketMakerPair(pair, value); } ``` However, the `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` function both sets the `pair` and exempts the `pair` from fees. This could potentially result in users being exempt from taxes when buying or selling tokens through the new `pair`. We would like to confirm with the team whether this is aligned with the original design.

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Show 5 more
LowRedundant And Unreasonable ApprovalGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The allowance is approved to the router based on the token swapping amount in the `_swapTokensForBNB` function. Therefore, approving the maximum allowance to the router is redundant and unnecessary. ```solidity=1030 function _swapTokensForBNB(uint256 tokenAmount) private { _approve(address(this), address(router), tokenAmount); address[] memory path = new address[](2); path[0] = address(this); path[1] = router.WETH(); // WETH is BNB in bsc try router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp ) {} catch {} } ``` ```solidity=888 _approve(address(this), address(router), type(uint256).max); ```

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LowRedundant CodeGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The linked code were declared but never used.

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LowState Variable Should Be Declared ConstantGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

State variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=855 uint256 feeDenominator = 10000; ``` - `feeDenominator` should be declared `constant`.

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsageGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=843 IRouter public router; ``` - The contract `GROKCEO` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter` interface via `router`.

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LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableGrok CEO - Audit · CertiK · 24 Jan 2024Open

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x6294deb10817e47a4ee6869db59c85f3ef4bee29Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

GROK CEO: questions

Is GROK CEO audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for GROK CEO, dated 24 Jan 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Grok CEO - Audit”).

Who audited GROK CEO?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for GROK CEO.

Are there open findings in GROK CEO’s audits?

15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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