Halo security record
As of 24 Oct 2026, Halo has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 5 Dec 2024. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Halo Wallet | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings3
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 0 |
HighCentralization RisksHalo Wallet · CertiK · 5 Dec 2024Acknowledged
In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following things: - `mint()`, mint tokens to specified addresses - `transferOwnership()`, transfer ownership - `renounceOwnership()`, give up ownership  In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `_pendingOwner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_pendingOwner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following things: - `acceptOwnership()`, get the ownership
Open the reportHighCentralized Balance ManipulationHalo Wallet · CertiK · 5 Dec 2024Acknowledged
In the contract `HaloToken`, the role `owner` has the authority to update the token balance of an arbitrary account without sanity restriction. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate users' balances. For example, the attacker could also update his/her balance to a large number, sell these tokens, and cause the token price to drop.
Open the reportHighInitial Token DistributionHalo Wallet · CertiK · 5 Dec 2024Acknowledged
All of the `2_100_000_000e18` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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