As of 3 Nov 2026, HashBit has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 10 Jan 2023. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HashBit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| HashBit-Peg HBIT Token | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · cyberscope.io |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 18 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `BABYTOKENDividendTracker` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DividendPayingToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `OwnableUpgradeable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. 
Open the reportThe `swapAndLiquify` function converts half of the `swapTokens` to BNB. The other half of `swapTokens` and part of the converted BNB are deposited into the `AntiBotBABYTOKEN-BNB` pool as liquidity. For every `swapAndLiquify` function call, a small amount of BNB leftover in the contract. This is because the price of `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` drops after swapping the first half of the `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` tokens into BNBs, and the other half of `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` tokens require less than the converted BNB to be paired with it when adding liquidity. The contract doesn't appear to provide a way to withdraw those BNB, and they will be locked in the contract forever.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xeda3…83e00xeda3866f07566d9379a91a07f8d62e19c03183e0 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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