IRIS Network security record

As of 3 Nov 2026, IRIS Network has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 1 Mar 2024. Those reports list 1 open critical finding. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
1 open critical finding
Reported in “ICS-721 Implementation (Golang)” by CertiK, Nov 2023. Not marked fixed in that report. See the findings
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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits2

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
BEP20 Contract for IRISnet Token (IRIS)Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
ICS-721 Implementation (Golang)Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the report1 open critical findingOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings25

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical100
High120
Medium020
Low1306
HighCentralization Related RisksBEP20 Contract for IRISnet Token (IRIS) · CertiK · 1 Mar 2024Acknowledged

In the contract `BEP20Cosmos`, the role **Owner** has authority over the following functions: - function `mint()` Any compromise to the **Owner** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint an arbitrary amount of tokens.

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HighInitial Token DistributionBEP20 Contract for IRISnet Token (IRIS) · CertiK · 1 Mar 2024Acknowledged

All of the `IRIS` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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MediumSolidity Version Not RecommendedBEP20 Contract for IRISnet Token (IRIS) · CertiK · 1 Mar 2024Acknowledged

Solidity frequently releases new compiler versions with improved security features and bug fixes. Using an outdated version prevents access to these enhancements and may leave the smart contract vulnerable to known issues. ```solidity pragma solidity 0.5.16; ```

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MediumClass ID Could Be Incorrectly Parsed If It ContaiICS-721 Implementation (Golang) · CertiK · 1 Nov 2023Acknowledged

Files: - `types/trace.go` Commits: - [`cfc058309adcf73478d3828a524ecf8e546420ed`](https://github.com/bianjieai/nft-transfer/tree/cfc058309adcf73478d3828a524ecf8e546420ed) - [`87cdf3b7dd969237c9ffc8e056bfc24cab5e2bba`](https://github.com/bianjieai/nft-transfer/tree/87cdf3b7dd969237c9ffc8e056bfc24cab5e2bba) - [`fa7bd3f3cb1ebe24f781953a781add96509b4c2a`](https://github.com/bianjieai/nft-transfer/tree/fa7bd3f3cb1ebe24f781953a781add96509b4c2a) The `rawClassID` is converted to class trace by splitting with the separator `/` in the function `ParseClassTrace()`, which creates a new string slice of `classSplit`. The `Path` and `BaseClassId` are determined by the position in the string slice. ```go=67 func ParseClassTrace(rawClassID string) ClassTrace { classSplit := strings.Split(rawClassID, "/") if classSplit[0] == rawClassID { return ClassTrace{ Path: "", BaseClassId: rawClassID, } } return ClassTrace{ Path: strings.Join(classSplit[:len(classSplit)-1], "/"), BaseClassId: classSplit[len(classSplit)-1], } } ``` It works fine if there is no "/" in the input, `rawClassID`. In case that the `rawClassID` contains "/", it could be an issue with this splitting method. For example, the following class trace parsing could occur: > e.g. "class-1/2" => ClassTrace{Path: "class-1", BaseClassId: "2"} which would impact the following usage of the class trace and lead to the collision of class trace afterwards. Note that there is no restriction in the ADR nft modules in [`ADR-043`](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-043-nft-module.md#nft). Additionally, it should not restrict the classID with "/", because the `voucherClassID` could be constructed with prefix `ibc/` during the interchain NFT transfer. Then the voucher NFT will be minted in the upper level NFT modules. **Reference**: - https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/docs/architecture/adr-043-nft-module.md#nft

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x05c50a62b0b87be1ffb1cf3b77d9edba834ef6f7Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

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