As of 2 Nov 2026, Kroma has 3 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 3 Dec 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kroma Network - Token Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Spectrum Protocol - Audit(Addendum) | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Spectrum Protocol - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 6 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Low | 14 | 0 | 10 |
The contract `EcoERC4626Upgradeable` inherits `ERC4626Upgradeable`, which is a token vault. Within the `ERC20RebasedUpgradeable` contract, users can stake underlying tokens to acquire shares, functioning as a token vault. When the vault, whether it's `EcoERC4626Upgradeable` or `ERC20RebasedUpgradeable`, is empty or close to empty, deposits are at high risk of being stolen through front-running. This occurs when a donation to the vault inflates the price of a share, a situation also known as a donation or inflation attack. Essentially, this is a problem of slippage. Reference: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues/3706
Open the reportThe `_findIndex()` functions are internal and not called by the contract. ```solidity=191 function _findIndex(EnumerableSet.AddressSet storage $, address item) internal view returns (uint256 i) { i = $._inner._positions[bytes32(uint256(uint160(item)))]; if (i == 0) revert Spectrum(SpectrumErrors.NotExist); } function _findIndex(address[] memory addrs, address item) internal pure returns (uint256 i) { unchecked { for (; i < addrs.length; i++) { if (addrs[i] == item) return i; } } revert Spectrum(SpectrumErrors.NotExist); } ```
Open the reportThe contract's constructor is designed to accept an `initialOwner` parameter intended to designate the owner of the contract. The constructor transfers ownership to the specified `initialOwner` and subsequently calls the `grantSelectorRole()` function, which is an `onlyAdmin` function. If the `initialOwner` parameter provided is not the same as the deployer's address, the deployer is not the contract owner when calling `grantSelectorRole()`, resulting in a failed contract deployment, limiting the flexibility intended by transferring the ownership at the deployment phase. The root cause is that the ownership transfer to `initialOwner` happens before `grantSelectorRole()` is called, and since the deployer no longer has ownership permission, the deployer cannot execute the `onlyAdmin` function `grantSelectorRole()`.
Open the report`_proxyAdmin()` do not require modifying the contract state, nor do they need to receive Ether. However, these functions are not labeled with `pure` or `view` modifiers.
Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction.
Open the report- Contract ·`ERC20MetadataUpgradeable`· extends `ERC20Upgradeable` - contract `EcoERC20Upgradeable`· extends `ERC20PermitUpgradeable` - contract `ERC20MintableUpgradeable`· extends `ERC20Upgradeable` and `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable` - contract `WETH`· extends `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable` - contract `EcoOwnable` extends `Ownable2StepUpgradeable` - contract `SelectorRoleControlUpgradeable` extends `PausableUpgradeable` and `AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable` - contract `EcoProxyAdmin` extends `MulticallUpgradeable` - contract `EcoERC1155Upgradeable` extends `ERC1155PausableUpgradeable`, `ERC1155BurnableUpgradeable` and `ERC1155SupplyUpgradeable` - contract `NFT_Mintable`· extends `PausableUpgradeable`, `ERC721BurnableUpgradeable` and `ERC721EnumerableUpgradeable` - contract `ERC721PausableUpgradeable` extends `PausableUpgradeable` - contract `ERC20RebasedUpgradeable`· extends `ERC20PermitUpgradeable` - contract `EcoERC4626Upgradeable`· extends `ERC20PermitUpgradeable` and `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable` but these extended contracts are not initialized by the current contracts. Generally, the initializer function of a contract should always call all the initializer functions of the contracts that they extend.
Open the reportThe functions marked as 'view' or 'pure' are unnecessarily restricted by the 'restrict' modifier. These functions are designed to be read-only, meaning they do not modify the state on the blockchain. However, they are restricted so that only a specific address can call them. It's important to note that even private state variables can be read off-chain, rendering the access restriction on these functions ineffective.
Open the reportHTTP/HTTPS should not be used for token metadata because the domain and web server owner can change token metadata at will to dramatically affect token value. See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/erc721. The function doesn't verify if the supplied `_baseURI` is a valid IPFS location. The function doesn't verify if the supplied `_baseURI` is a valid IPFS location.
Open the reportPerforming division by zero would raise an error and revert the transaction. ```solidity=48 ethValue = (gSnap.spSnap.evalValue * spAmount) / gSnap.info.spETH.totalSupply(); ``` --- ```solidity=53 spAmount = (gSnap.info.spETH.totalSupply() * ethValue) / gSnap.spSnap.evalValue; ```
Open the reportWhen a loop allows an arbitrary number of iterations or accesses state variables in its body, the function may run out of gas and revert the transaction. ```solidity=60 while (start < stop) { ``` Function `ERC721QueryableUpgradeable.tokensOfOwnerIn` contains a loop and its loop condition depends on parameters: `start`, `stop`.
Open the reportThe contract serves as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third-party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=12 import { IweETH } from "../vendor/etherfi.sol"; ``` - The contract `SpectrumCoreUtils` interacts with the third-party contract with `etherfi` interface via `assetEvaluator`. ```solidity=13 import { IeETH, IweETH, ILiquidityPool, ILiquifier } from "../vendor/etherfi.sol"; import { IstETH, IwstETH } from "../vendor/lido.sol"; ``` - The contract `SpectrumHubUtils` interacts with the third-party contract with `etherfi` interface via `actionForStake`. - The contract `SpectrumHubUtils` interacts with the third-party contract with `lido` interface via `actionForStake`. ```solidity=7 import { IKromaBridge } from "../../eco-libs/kroma/interfaces.sol"; ``` - The contract `SpectrumHubLogic` interacts with the third-party contract with `IKromaBridge` interface via `info.bridge`.
Open the reportThe `SelectorRoleControlUpgradeable` contract does not protect their initializers. An attacker can call the initializer and assume ownership of the logic contract, whereby she can perform privileged operations that trick unsuspecting users into believing that she is the owner of the upgradeable contract.
Open the reportThe return value `resultAmount` is declared but never used in the function body.
Open the report- Contract ·`ERC20MetadataUpgradeable`· extends `ERC20Upgradeable` - contract `EcoERC20Upgradeable`· extends `ERC20PermitUpgradeable` - contract `ERC20MintableUpgradeable`· extends `ERC20Upgradeable` and `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable` - contract `WETH`· extends `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable` - contract `EcoOwnable` extends `Ownable2StepUpgradeable` - contract `SelectorRoleControlUpgradeable` extends `PausableUpgradeable` and `AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable` - contract `EcoProxyAdmin` extends `MulticallUpgradeable` but these extended contracts are not initialized by the current contracts. Generally, the initializer function of a contract should always call all the initializer functions of the contracts that they extends.
Open the reportIn the functions `_fundReceiveFrom()` and `_stakeReceiveFrom()`, there is no check to ensure that the value retrieved from `$.underlyingToIdx[$.info.fundUnderlying]` exists in the `$.idxAssetList`. This could result in the use of the incorrect `idxAsset` and `idxAmount`, leading to the receipt of incorrect amounts of tokens. ```solidity=211 function _fundReceiveFrom( address requestedAsset, address from, uint256 amount ) internal returns (address idxAsset, uint256 idxAmount) { SpectrumCoreStorage storage $ = _getSpectrumCoreStorage(); if (requestedAsset != $.info.fundUnderlying) revert Spectrum(SpectrumErrors.InValidFund); if (from != _msgSender()) revert Spectrum(SpectrumErrors.InValidFrom); idxAmount = IstETH(payable(requestedAsset)).submit{ value: amount }(address(0)); idxAsset = $.underlyingToIdx[requestedAsset]; IEcoERC20(requestedAsset).safeIncreaseAllowance(idxAsset, idxAmount); idxAmount = IidxAssetWrapper(idxAsset).wrap(idxAmount); } ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xf1af…c8970xf1af9d897956434e5d7bd875fd231e044890c897 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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