Kusunoki Samurai security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, Kusunoki Samurai has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 6 May 2024. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kusunoki Samurai - Audit 2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Original removed |
Findings5
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 1 |
HighCentralization Risks in `Kusunoki`Kusunoki Samurai - Audit 2 · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open
In the contract `Kusunoki` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove user from blacklist, pause/unpause the contract, update Uniswap pool address and set lock date. -Kusunoki-_owner.svg) In the contract `OwnableUpgradeable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer/renounce ownership. -OwnableUpgradeable-_owner.svg)
Open the reportHighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeKusunoki Samurai - Audit 2 · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open
In the contract Kusunoki, the role `admin` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the proxy contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.
Open the reportHighInitial Token DistributionKusunoki Samurai - Audit 2 · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open
All of the KUS tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportLowUser cannot remove liquidity or purchase token beKusunoki Samurai - Audit 2 · CertiK · 6 May 2024Open
function `_beforeTokenTransfer` restricts anyone to transfer KUS token from the pool before `_lockedDate`, which means that users cannot purchase tokens nor can they remove liquidity. Currently, `_lockedDate` is hardcoded to `1763250300` which is roughly November 2025.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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