L2Finance security record

As of 25 Oct 2026, L2Finance has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 2 May 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.

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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

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AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
L2FinanceSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium021
Low006
HighCentralization Risks in L2Finance.solL2Finance · CertiK · 2 May 2023Acknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer the ownership to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/dafc365c1b904954919c64aed0829ca6/diagrams/centralization_L2Finance-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `HasNoEther` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. This centralization risk may lead to a single point of failure and gives the owner significant control over the contract's behavior: 1. `reclaimEther()` - allows the owner to transfer all ether in the contract to the owner. 2. `reclaimToken()` - allows the owner to transfer any type of ERC20 in the contract to the owner. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and bring unpredictable damages to the project. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/dafc365c1b904954919c64aed0829ca6/diagrams/centralization_L2Finance-HasNoEther-_owner.svg) In the contract `L2Finance` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `sellBurnFee`, set the `excludeFee`/`_open`/`_key`, set the `_swap` and `_swapAllow` to block certain users from swapping functionality. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/dafc365c1b904954919c64aed0829ca6/diagrams/centralization_L2Finance-L2Finance-_owner.svg)

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HighInitial Token DistributionL2Finance · CertiK · 2 May 2023Acknowledged

All L2FI tokens are sent to the deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

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MediumIncompatibility with Deflationary TokensL2Finance · CertiK · 2 May 2023Acknowledged

When transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=843 bool success = IERC20(_usdtAddr).transferFrom(_msgSender(), address(this), amountUSDTIn); ``` - Transferring tokens by `amountUSDTIn`. ```solidity=841 uint256 amountL2FIOut = _getL2FIOut(amountUSDTIn, poolL2FIBal, poolUSDTBal); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `L2Finance._getL2FIOut`, - `uint256 denominator = poolUSDTBal.add(amountUSDTIn);` - In `SafeMath.add`, - `uint256 c = a + b;` - The `amountUSDTIn` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees. --- ```solidity=861 bool success = IERC20(_usdtAddr).transferFrom(_msgSender(), address(this), amountUSDTIn); ``` - Transferring tokens by `amountUSDTIn`. ```solidity=859 uint256 amountL2FIOut = _getL2FIOut(amountUSDTIn, poolL2FIBal, poolUSDTBal); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `L2Finance._getL2FIOut`, - `uint256 denominator = poolUSDTBal.add(amountUSDTIn);` - In `SafeMath.add`, - `uint256 c = a + b;` - The `amountUSDTIn` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.

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MediumLogical issues in reclaimToken functionL2Finance · CertiK · 2 May 2023Acknowledged

The function `reclaimToken()` can be called by the owner to drain all ERC20 tokens in the contract, including the USDT and the L2FI. This is both a centralization issue and a logical issue.

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