Lendroid Whalestreet security record

Ethereumlendroid.com

As of 3 Nov 2026, Lendroid Whalestreet has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 26 Nov 2020. Those reports list no open critical findings.

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Across 2 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits2

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
Lendroid WhalestreetSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · certificate.quantstamp.com
Lendroid Protocol version 1.0Security firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · certificate.quantstamp.com

Findings24

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High003
Medium019
Low407
LowAllowance Double-Spend ExploitLendroid Protocol version 1.0 · Quantstamp · 18 Feb 2019Open

As it presently is constructed, the contract is vulnerable to the allowance double-spend exploit, as with other ERC20 tokens. An example of an exploit goes as follows: 1. Alice allows Bob to transfer N amount of Alice's tokens (N>0) by calling the approve() method on Token smart contract (passing Bob's address and N as method arguments) 2. After some time, Alice decides to change from N to M (M>0) the number of Alice's tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls the approve() method again, this time passing Bob's address and M as method argments 3. Bob notices Alice's second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls the transferFrom() method to transfer N Alice's tokens somewhere 4. If Bob's transaction will be executed before Alice's transaction, then Bob will successfully transfer N Alice's tokens and will gain an ability to transfer another M tokens 5. Before Alice notices any irregularities, Bob calls transferFrom() method again, this time to transfer M Alice's tokens. The exploit (as described above) is mitigated through use of functions that increase/decrease the allowance relative to its current value, such as increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance. Pending community agreement on an ERC standard that would protect against this exploit, we recommend that developers of applications dependent on approve() / transferFrom() should keep in mind that they have to set allowance to 0 first and verify if it was used before setting the new value. Teams who decide to wait for such a standard should make these recommendations to app developers who work with their token contract.

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LowBlock Timestamp ManipulationLendroid Protocol version 1.0 · Quantstamp · 18 Feb 2019Open

Projects may rely on block timestamps for various purposes. However, it's important to realize that miners individually set the timestamp of a block, and attackers may be able to manipulate timestamps for their own purposes. If a smart contract relies on a timestamp, it must take this into account. (L241, 308, 327, 350, 404)

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LowOwner Can Whitelist Tokens, Whitelist Wranglers, and Set Position Threshold (Centralization of Power)Lendroid Protocol version 1.0 · Quantstamp · 18 Feb 2019Open

Smart contracts will often have owner variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. However, this centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users, especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the owner. L100 set_position_threshold() and L107 set_wrangler_status() both can only be called by the owner but can impact who can interact with the smart contracts.

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LowOwner can withdraw deposited collateral (Centralization of Power)Lendroid Protocol version 1.0 · Quantstamp · 18 Feb 2019Open

The escape_hatch() function allows the owner to withdraw all tokens that the contract owns. A malicious owner will be able to withdraw all tokens that have been deposited as collateral by borrowers.

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No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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