LinoSwap security record

In the contract `LinoswapV1Factory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - change the `protocolStatus` to unset all protocol fees, or to enable them during buys, sells, or both; - allow or disallow the address of a basic curve; - allow or disallow the address of a signer; - change the address of the `protocolRecipient`, this is the address that receives the protocol fees; - change the address of the `_poolTemplate`, this will change the implementation of any new pools that are created; - allow or disallow the address of a rarity value curve; - change the protocol share, which is the share of the swap fee that is allocated for the protocol fee; - withdraw the ETH accumulated from protocol fees from all pools; - allow or disallow a rarity value function.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` the role `_factory` and the owner of the `_factory` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_factory` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - withdraw any NFT's held by the contract that are not in the reserves of the pool; - withdraw the protocol fees that have accumulated in the pool; - withdraw any ERC20 tokens held by the contract; - pause or unpause swaps.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` the owner of the `_factory` and owner of the `_nft` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - change the royalty status to take royalties on buys, sells, both, or neither; - change the royalty receiver info, which allows them to set what addresses will receive royalties and the share for each address.  --- In the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` any signer that is allowed can provide any `liquidityNFT.liquidityNFTIDs` and `liquidityNFT.rarityRankPercentageNFTIDs` as inputs. Any compromise to an allowed signer may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and manipulate the `rarityRankPercentage` of the `NFTIDs` so that they are either more rare than they should be and thus overvalued, or they are less rare than they should be and thus are undervalued.

In the contract `LinoswapV1Factory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the exploiter to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Change the protocol fee share and recipient and also withdraw any protocol fees. - Allow rarity value curves, rarity functions, and basic curves which can be used to create pools that the exploiter can then exploit. - Allow a signer, which can then sign malicious `LiquidityNFT`'s allowing them to set the rarity rank percentage as high or low as they want to gain additional tokens when swapping, adding liquidity, or removing liquidity.  --- In addition, in the contract `LinoswapV1Pool` the Factory `owner` has control over the following functions: - withdrawProtocolFee() - withdrawNFT() Any compromise to the factory `owner` account may allow the exploiter to take advantage of this authority and withdraw protocol fees or NFT's not in the pool held by the contract.

The name `_isNFTsNotInPool()` implies that if all `NFT`'s are not in the pool that this will return true. However it returns false if this is the case.

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party `NFT` protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.