LionCEO security record

In the contract `LIONCEO` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change sensitive state addresses and dividend data.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce ownership. 

All LCEO tokens are sent to the contract owner when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the owner can distribute LCEO tokens without the consensus of the community.

For a user to receive dividends, their token balance should exceed the `minimumTokenBalanceForDividends` variable. This variable can be changed via the `updateMinimumTokenBalanceForDividends()` function. However, when `minimumTokenBalanceForDividends` is changed, the users that can receive dividends is unchanged. This means that if `minimumTokenBalanceForDividends` is increased, users whose balance is below the new `minimumTokenBalanceForDividends` but above the old `minimumTokenBalanceForDividends` can still receive dividends.

In the function `_transfer()`, the function `process()` is called to update state information. The execution of `process()` helps maintain intended tokenomics but passes the cost of gas to the address executing `_transfer()`.

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

A sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The linked functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `uniswapV2Router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()`

State variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=907 uint256 public gasForProcessing = 300_000; ``` - `gasForProcessing` should be declared `constant`.

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=894 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router; ``` - The contract `LIONCEO` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapV2Router`.

The return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=985 ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance); ```

The `SafeMath` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow.