MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by Quantstamp, dated 15 Dec 2021. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
Findings8
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 4 | 3 |
HighSanitize input in `CollectionCore.constructor(...)`MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit · Quantstamp · 15 Dec 2021Fixed
The `constructor(...)` does not check if`_crsAddress` and `_creator` are different from address 0x0. Similarly, the `constructor()` does not validate if the `_royaltyPercentage` is within a valid range. Thus, any number (even exceeding 100%) can be passed to `_royaltyPercentage` with serious consequences. For instance, the computation of royalties in function `royaltyInfo(...)` will be compromised. The `_initialBaseURI` is not validated as well. There is no inline comment indicating the reason for the command `_pause()`. The code is reproduced below. ``` constructor(string memory _tokenName, string memory _tokenSymbol, address _crsAddress, uint256 _totalSupply, address _creator, uint16 _royaltyPercentage, string memory _initialBaseURI) ERC721(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol) { setCreatorRegistryStore(_crsAddress); require(_totalSupply > 0, "supply > 0"); // TODO: Should we have a higher limit for totalSupply totalMediaSupply = _totalSupply; creator = _creator; royaltyPercentage = _royaltyPercentage; baseURI = _initialBaseURI; _pause(); } ```
Open the reportLowOwnership can be renouncedMakersPlace CollectionCore Audit · Quantstamp · 15 Dec 2021Fixed
The contract is Ownable. `Ownable.sol` has the `function renounceOwnership()`. Although it can only be called by the `owner`, such a function leaves the contract without an owner, which surely compromises any ability to manage the contract. Below we present the code of this dangerous function. ``` function renounceOwnership() public virtual onlyOwner { _transferOwnership(address(0)); } ```
Open the reportLowUnimplemented code in `CollectionCore.constructor(...)`MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit · Quantstamp · 15 Dec 2021Fixed
The `constructor(...)` has a comment stating that there is code to be implemented related to validating the upper limit for `total Supply`.
Open the reportLowUnimplemented code in `CollectionCore.mintTokens(...)`MakersPlace CollectionCore Audit · Quantstamp · 15 Dec 2021Fixed
The function `mintTokens(...)` has code still to be implemented. The same piece of code is probably missing in the function `oboMintTokens(...)`.
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