MARBLEX security record

### `marblex_coin::coin_mbx` Module 1. **Minter Role**: - Control over the creation of new coins. - Function: - `mint_to`: Mints new coins and allocates them to a specified address, influencing the coin supply. - If the private key is compromised, it could lead to overproduction or misallocation of coins, affecting the currency's value. 2. **Burner Role**: - Authority over the destruction of coins. - Function: - `burn`: Destroys a specified amount of coins, reducing the total supply. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can manipulate the total coin supply, impacting the currency's economics. 3. **Freezer Role**: - Restrict access to user accounts. - Functions: - `set_freeze`/`set_freeze_many`: Freezes user accounts, preventing transactions. - `set_unfreeze`/`set_unfreeze_many`: Unfreezes accounts, restoring transaction capabilities. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can freeze/unfreeze users' accounts and disrupt user access and operations. 4. **Pauser Role**: - Halt or resume contract operations. - Functions: - `pause`: Suspends all contract activities. - `unpause`: Resumes contract operations. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can disrupt service availability for all users. 5. **Owner**: - refers to @marblex_coin, which can `initialize` the `coin_mbx` module. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can take advantage of the privileged functionalities. ### `marblex_coin::access_control_enumerable` Module 1. **Owner Role**: - The deployer of the module, which has control over role management. - Key Functions: - `transfer_ownership`: Transfers `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` ownership to a new address. - `set_role_admin`: Assigns or changes the admin for any role, giving the owner control over who manages each role. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can reallocate roles or change ownership, gaining full control of the module. 2. **DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE**: - Default admin for all roles that can manage all roles in the `coin_mbx` module if the admin role not set. - Key Functions: - `grant_role`: Grants any role to any account, controlling permissions. - `revoke_role`: Removes any role from any account, potentially stripping powers. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can reallocate roles, gaining the control of the module. 3. **Role Admins**: - The role admins are designated by the owner role and manage certain roles. - Key Functions: - `grant_role`: Grants a certain role to any account, controlling the given role's permission. - `revoke_role`: Removes a certain role from any account, potentially stripping powers. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can reallocate a given role, gaining the power of the given role..

### `warp::admin` Module **Account `warp`** has privilege over: - add_admin: adding a new address to the admin list. - remove_admin: removing an address from the admin list. ### `warp::bridge` Module 1. **Admin Role**: - Control over the module setup. - Function: - `set_fee_address`: set the address to receive the fee - `set_fee_amount`: set new fee amount - If the private key is compromised, 2. **Account `warp`**: - Control over the module setup. - Function: - `handle_bridge_swap`: Process bridge swap and mint token on Aptos. - If the private key is compromised, 3. **Operator Role**: - Process Swap. - Function: - `set_fee_address`: set address to receive the fee - `set_fee_amount`: set new fee amount - If the private key is compromised, 4. **Validator Role**: - Issue signature for swap ### `warp::operator` Module **Account `warp`**: - Set accounts in the operator list. - Function: - `add_operator`: Add new account to the operator list. - `remove_operator`: Remove account from the operator list. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can add arbitrary accounts to the operator list which will affect `wrap::bridge` module as well. ### `warp::pauser` Module 1. **Account `warp`**: - Set accounts in the pauser list or update pause status. - Function: - `add_pauser`: Add new account to the pauser list. - `remove_pauser`: Remove the account from the pauser list. - `pause`: Update `pauserConfig.is_paused` to true. - `unpaused`: Update `pauserConfig.is_paused` to false. 2. **`Pauser` Role** - Update pause status. - Function: - `pause`: Update `pauserConfig.is_paused` to true. - `unpaused`: Update `pauserConfig.is_paused` to false. If the private key is compromised, the attacker can add arbitrary accounts to the pause list and update module status, which will affect `wrap::bridge` module as well. - `wrap::bridge::request_bridge_swap` - `wrap::bridge::handle_bridge_swap` ### `warp::validator` Module 1. **Account `warp`**: - Set accounts in the pauser list or update pause status. - Function: - `set_threshold`: Set the threshold for signature powers. - `add_validator`: Add the account to the validator list. - `remove_validator`: Remove the account from the validator list. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can manipulate the validator list and the cross-chain operations, which will affect `wrap::bridge` module as well. 2. **Validator Role**: - Provide signatures for the cross-chain operations' validation. - If the private key is compromised, the attacker can manipulate the cross-chain operations, which will affect `wrap::bridge` module as well. --- The Aptos Move provides a code upgrade feature(with policy `compatible` by default) that allows deployed Move code to be replaced with the newer code based on the upgrade policy. Any compromise to the deployer account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority to control the implementation of the program, for example, burning tokens, which raises potential security risks. Reference: [Upgrading Move Code](https://aptos.web3doc.top/guides/move-guides/upgrading-move-code/)