As of 2 Nov 2026, Masa has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 7 May 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Masa - Staking #1 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Masa - Token #1 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 4 |
The `MasaTokenOFT` contract transfers its ownership to the `_delegate` address specified in the constructor. This grants the `_delegate` full control over the contract, including the ability to modify LayerZero endpoint configurations, change the token supply, and upgrade the contract. If `_delegate` is a centralized entity or individual, it introduces a centralization risk to the contract. An attacker or a malicious centralized entity with control over the `_delegate` address could potentially exploit this control to manipulate the contract in a way that is detrimental to other users or the integrity of the token.
Open the reportIn the contract `MasaToken` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  - `mint(address to, uint256 amount)`: Mints `amount` new tokens for the address `to`. Only accessible by addresses with the `MINTER_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address. --- In the contract `MasaToken` the role `PAUSER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  - `pause()`: Pauses all token transfers, preventing any transfers, minting, and burning operations. Only accessible by addresses with the `PAUSER_ROLE`. - `unpause()`: Unpauses all token transfers, allowing transfers, minting, and burning operations to resume. Only accessible by addresses with the `PAUSER_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `PAUSER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the protocol. --- Moreover, the `MasaToken` contract transfers its ownership to the `_delegate` address specified in the constructor. This grants the `_delegate` full control over the contract, including the ability to modify LayerZero endpoint configurations, change the token supply, and upgrade the contract. If `_delegate` is a centralized entity or individual, it introduces a centralization risk to the contract. An attacker or a malicious centralized entity with control over the `_delegate` address could potentially exploit this control to manipulate the contract in a way that is detrimental to other users or the integrity of the token.
Open the reportIn the contract `MasaToken`, the role `MINTER_ROLE` has the authority to update the token balance of an arbitrary account without sanity restriction. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate users' balances by minting any amount of tokens to any address.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="masa"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us