As of 14 Oct 2026, MAZE has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 4 Jul 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAZE - audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Not recorded. See the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 2 |
In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the ownership.  In the contract `RoyalMasterChef` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the basic configuration of the project.  The function `safeMazeTransfer()` use `rewardAddr` to send the reward. But when the balances of the `rewardAddr` are not enough, the `rewardAddr` will transfer all the balance. In extreme cases, the balance of the `rewardAddr` is zero and users can never get the rewards.
Open the reportThe function `deposit()` takes 1% of the amount as the fees. However, there is no way to get those fees out.
Open the reportWhen the same LP token is added into a pool more than once in function `add()`, the total amount of reward in function `updatePool()` will be incorrectly calculated. The current implementation is relying on the operation correctness to avoid repeatedly adding the same LP token to the pool, as the function will only be called by the owner.
Open the reportWhen transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user stakes 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) in a MasterChef, only 90 tokens actually arrived in the contract. However, the user can still withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. The MasterChef takes the pool token balance(the `lpSupply`) into account when calculating the users' reward. An attacker can repeat the process of deposit and withdraw to lower the token balance(`lpSupply`) in a deflationary token pool and cause the contract to increase the reward amount. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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