Metahub audit reports

Metahub has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 30 Aug 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm17

Statuses are the security firms’ own

17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 3 medium, 11 low (14 open, 3 acknowledged).

High
3
Medium
3
Low
11
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Risks in METAHUBToken.sol

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralized Token Holding Position Risk

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Incorrect Condition Check

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Incorrect validations

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Logical issue of transfer to zero address

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Divide Before Multiply

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Logical issue about _validateSelling

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Logical issue about cashOutTaxPercentage

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Logical issue about totalTaxPercentage

    METAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

All 17 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
METAHUBTokenSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on Polygon (POS)None openFindings: 3 high · 3 medium · 11 low
3 acknowledged · 14 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium030
Low1100
HighCentralization Related RisksMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

In the contract `METAHUBToken` the roles `developmentAddress` and `mn` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `developmentAddress` and `mn` accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint vesting MetaHub tokens to the `developmentAddress` EOA address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/60edb98540a54d0b82f02dc2c35cf3f2/diagrams/centralization_METAHUBToken-METAHUBToken-_development.svg) In the contract `METAHUBToken` the role `vault` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint up to `maxMintingBeMinted` MetaHub tokens to the `vault` address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/60edb98540a54d0b82f02dc2c35cf3f2/diagrams/centralization_METAHUBToken-METAHUBToken-_vault.svg)

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HighCentralization Risks in METAHUBToken.solMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

In the contract `METAHUBToken` the role `mn` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `mn` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - startVestingDevelopment(), to start the vesting of `developmentAddress` and mint 20% of DEVELOPMENT_ALLOCATION tokens to the `developmentAddress`. - updateTwoWayTaxWhitelist(), to update `twoWayTaxWhitelist`. - updateWaitStatus(), to update `config.wait`. - updateWaitingStatus(), to update `waitingList`. - disableWaitingFunction(), to disable `config.waitingFunctionEnabled`. - updateMaxContractMinting(), to update `maxMintingBeMinted` and `maxCLSBeMinted`. - setAddressBook(), to set the `addressBook` and call the internal function `_initDependentContracts()`. The `_initDependentContracts()` function can set the sensitive state variables such as uniswapV2Router, menToken, usdtToken, lpToken, swapAddress and etc. And it can approve unlimited allowance to these addresses. - updateConfig(), to update the config. - updateSoftCap(), to update the `config.softCap[_user]` for a user. - updateTaxWhitelist(), to update the `whitelistTax[_user][_type]`. - updateLSDTaxDiscount(), to update the `lsdDiscountTaxPercentages[_type]`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/60edb98540a54d0b82f02dc2c35cf3f2/diagrams/centralization_METAHUBToken-METAHUBToken-_mn.svg) In the contract `METAHUBToken` the role `clsAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `clsAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint up to `maxCLSBeMinted` amount of MetaHub tokens to the CLS contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/60edb98540a54d0b82f02dc2c35cf3f2/diagrams/centralization_METAHUBToken-METAHUBToken-_cls.svg) In the contract `TokenAuth` the role `bk` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `bk` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the roles `bk` and `mn`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/60edb98540a54d0b82f02dc2c35cf3f2/diagrams/centralization_TokenAuth-TokenAuth-_bk.svg)

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HighCentralized Token Holding Position RiskMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

In the contract METAHUBToken, tokens are gradually centralized into the `taxManager` address over time. This creates a severe centralization risk and can lead to manipulation of the tokenomics of the project. ```solidity function _transfer(address _from, address _to, uint _value) private { ... uint tax = _calculateTax(_from, _to, _value); if (tax > 0) { _balances[_to] += _value - tax; _balances[address(taxManager)] += tax; emit Transfer(_from, address(taxManager), tax); } ... } ``` Any compromise to the private keys of the taxManager address may allow a hacker to take advantage of the address authority and sell tokens on the market and/or remove the pool liquidity, causing a severe price drop.

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LowDivide Before MultiplyMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

Performing integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation. ```solidity=292 uint baseTax = _value * 1000 / taxManager.totalTaxPercentage(); ``` ```solidity=300 return baseTax * (oneHundredPercentageDecimal3 - lsdDiscountTaxPercentages[IMENToken.TaxType.Buy]) / oneHundredPercentageDecimal3; ``` --- ```solidity=322 return baseTax * (oneHundredPercentageDecimal3 - lsdDiscountTaxPercentages[IMENToken.TaxType.Claim]) / oneHundredPercentageDecimal3; ``` ```solidity=342 baseTax = baseTax * (oneHundredPercentageDecimal3 - lsdDiscountTaxPercentages[IMENToken.TaxType.Transfer]) / oneHundredPercentageDecimal3; ```

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LowLogical issue about _validateSellingMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

When selling tokens, there is a validation `_validateSelling` for cap and time interval checks. However, if the `userWhitelistTax.status` is true, the tax value is directly returned and the valition will not be effected.

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LowLogical issue about cashOutTaxPercentageMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

When the sold value is greater than the `cashOutTaxPercentage` of the deposited amount, the seller will be charged 50% selling tax. ```solidity=337 (uint deposited,) = vault.getUserInfo(_from); if (_value >= deposited * config.cashOutTaxPercentage / 100) { baseTax = _value / 2; } ```

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LowLogical issue about totalTaxPercentageMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

The scalar factor used to compute the base tax is determined by the `totalTaxPercentage` function of the external contract `taxManager`. This prevents readers of `METAHUBToken` from knowing the bounds on how much a transaction will be taxed.

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LowLogical issue of _validateAbilityMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

The function `_validateAbility` is used for many different external function calls. Only one address is validated, but operations generally involve multiple parties such as `_from`, `_to`, and `_msgSender`. We would like to know how the validated address is chosen for each external function. In particular, why does `transferFrom` validate the `_from` address but not `msg.sender`? Why does `mint` validate the `_to` address while `transfer` does not? Why does `startVestingDevelopment` validate any address considering that its caller `Mn` has control over the `config.wait` flag and the `waitingList` array? Have you considered perform validation directly in the external function calls instead of `_transfer` and `_mint` for greater control?

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LowMisleading Variable NamesMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

The field `METAHUBToken.Config.secondsInADay` leads readers to believe that its value is the number of seconds in a day. However, this field can be assigned to arbitrary values at different points in time, whereas the number of seconds in a day remains constant at 86400.

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LowRedundant external callMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

Some address book values are set in the function `_initDependentContracts()`. The `_initDependentContracts()` function will be called in the `setAddressBook()` function together with setting the addressBook. So it is not neccesary to call the external functions addressBook.get in the below codes: ```solidity if ( twoWayTaxWhitelist[_from] || twoWayTaxWhitelist[_to] || _to == addressBook.get("vault") || _from == addressBook.get("cls") || _to == addressBook.get("cls") || _from == addressBook.get("lsd") || _to == addressBook.get("lsd") || ... ) { return 0; }

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsageMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=54 IAddressBook public addressBook; ``` - The contract `METAHUBToken` interacts with third party contract with `IAddressBook` interface via `addressBook`. --- ```solidity=55 ITaxManager public taxManager; ``` - The contract `METAHUBToken` interacts with third party contract with `ITaxManager` interface via `taxManager`. --- ```solidity=56 ILSD public lsd; ``` - The contract `METAHUBToken` interacts with third party contract with `ILSD` interface via `lsd`. --- ```solidity=13 IAddressBook public addressBook; ``` - The contract `Auth` interacts with third party contract with `IAddressBook` interface via `addressBook`.

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LowUnused EventMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

Some events are never emitted, which can lead to confusion and code maintainability issues. ```solidity=72 event WaitingStatusUpdated(address user, bool status, uint timestamp); ``` - `WaitingStatusUpdated` is declared in `METAHUBToken` but never emitted.

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LowUnused State VariableMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

Some state variables are not used in the codebase. This can lead to incomplete functionality or potential vulnerabilities if these variables are expected to be utilized. Some variables in `METAHUBToken` are never used. ```solidity=12 uint public startVestingAdvisorAndTeamBlock; ``` ```solidity=58 uint private constant DECIMAL3 = 1000; ``` ```solidity=12 contract METAHUBToken is IBEP20, TokenAuth { ```

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LowUnused State VariableMETAHUBToken · CertiK · 30 Aug 2023Open

Some state variables are not used in the codebase. This can lead to incomplete functionality or potential vulnerabilities if these variables are expected to be utilized. Variable `DECIMAL3` in `METAHUBToken` is never used in `METAHUBToken`. ```solidity=58 uint private constant DECIMAL3 = 1000; ``` ```solidity=12 contract METAHUBToken is IBEP20, TokenAuth { ```

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x94b959c93761835f634b8d6e655070c58e2caa12Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Metahub: questions

Is Metahub audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Metahub, dated 30 Aug 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“METAHUBToken”).

Who audited Metahub?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Metahub.

Are there open findings in Metahub’s audits?

17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 3 medium, 11 low (14 open, 3 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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