Mineplex.io has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 27 Sep 2022; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 1 low (all open).
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plexus Pool - Audit 2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | None open | Findings: 1 high · 4 low 3 fixed · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 3 |
In the contract `TokenSwap` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily mint tokens to any account.  In the contract `TokenSwap` the role `SETTING_CONTRACT` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `SETTING_CONTRACT` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set the allowed blockchains and commission prices.  In addition, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the authority to assign `MINTER_ROLE` and `SETTING_CONTRACT` accounts. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily assign privileged accounts.
Open the reportAddresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses. - In function `swap()` and `_swap()`, input argument `externalRecipient` is not zero-checked before being used in the `SwapToken` event. ```solidity=1061 function swap( string memory externalRecipient, string memory toBlockchain, uint256 amount ) public payable virtual { require(msg.value >= commissionPrice[toBlockchain], "TokenSwap: low gas price."); payable(recipientCommission).transfer(msg.value); _swap(msg.sender, address(this), externalRecipient, toBlockchain, amount); } ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0f67…5e240x0f67a226c385500c68ffa8bb7fbe0db15fe65e24 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Mineplex.io, dated 27 Sep 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Plexus Pool - Audit 2”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Mineplex.io.
2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 1 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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