Monke has 2 public audit reports from CertiK and Cyberscope; the latest is CertiK, 29 Mar 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 13 low (all open).
Initial Token Distribution
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Old Router Retains Infinite Allowance
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Potential significant impact on the token price i
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Third-Party Dependency Usage
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Comment Inconsistency
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Inefficient Check for Presale Addresses in Token
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
No Slippage Check
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
The `maxBuyTaxes` is constantly zero
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
The new owner is not added to `_liquidityHolders`
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Unreasonable Approval
Monkecoin · CertiK · 29 Mar 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monkecoin | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 3 medium · 9 low 3 fixed · 11 open | Original removed |
| Monkecoin | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 6 low 6 open | cyberscope.io ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 13 | 0 | 2 |
All of the `Monkecoin` tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportThere exists functionality to update the `dexRouter` used. However, upon update, the new `dexRouter` is given infinite allowance, and the account corresponding to the old `dexRouter` also retains infinite allowance.
Open the reportThe contract contains a function `enableTrading()` which initializes the `swapAmount` without a maximum value constraint. This lack of validation can lead to the `swapAmount` being set to an excessively high number. In the `_transfer()` function, when a sell action is performed, `Monkecoin` fees collected in the contract are swapped for BNB if `contractSwapEnabled` is true and the `swapThreshold` is met. The absence of a maximum `swapAmount` check in the `enableTrading()` function creates a vulnerability where a large `swapAmount` could be executed, potentially resulting in a significant amount of `Monkecoin` being sold on the DEX pair, leading to a drastic price drop.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=136 IRouter02 public dexRouter; ``` - The contract `Monkecoin` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter02` interface via `dexRouter`. --- ```solidity=150 Initializer initializer; ``` - The `Initializer` is an unverified contract. The contract `Monkecoin` interacts with the `Initializer` contract: - The `initializer.checkUser()` function is called in token transfer process to perform token transfer checks and block blacklisted users. - The token contract is initiated with configurations provided by the `Initializer`, e.g. LP pair address, DEX router addresses, `swapThreshold` and `swapAmount`.
Open the report```solidity=187 function transferOwner(address newOwner) external onlyOwner { require(newOwner != address(0), "Call renounceOwnership to transfer owner to the zero address."); require(newOwner != DEAD, "Call renounceOwnership to transfer owner to the zero address."); ``` The function name mentioned in the error messages should be `transferOwner`. Line 189 checks that `newOwner` is not the DEAD address, but the message advises to check for "the zero address". --- ```solidity=381 require(swapAmount >= _tTotal / 1_000_000, "Cannot be lower than 0.00001% of total supply."); require(swapThreshold >= _tTotal / 1_000_000, "Cannot be lower than 0.00001% of total supply."); ``` The "0.00001% of total supply" should be `_tTotal / 10_000_000`. --- ```solidity=531 require(token != address(this), "Cannot sweep native tokens."); ``` The token checked is `Monkecoin`.
Open the reportThe token selling process includes a check (L456) to verify whether the token transfer destination address is a presale address. The token selling process involves transferring tokens to a DEX pair (L439). The function then proceeds to verify whether the transfer destination address is a presale address (L456). This verification appears unnecessary since, by design, a DEX pair cannot be considered a presale address.
Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset.
Open the reportThe `maxBuyTaxes` consistently remains at zero: ```solidity=130 uint256 constant public maxBuyTaxes = 0; ``` Consequently, the `buyFee` is always zero, rendering the `buyFee` redundant as it never comes into effect.
Open the reportIn the `constructor()`, the owner is added to the `_liquidityHolders`. However, in the function `transferOwner()`, the new owner is not added to the `_liquidityHolders` and the old owner is not removed from the `_liquidityHolders`. The old owner still has the issue in the function `renounceOwnership()`.
Open the reportThe allowance should be approved to the router based on the token swapping amount in the `contractSwap()` function. Therefore, approving the maximum allowance to the router could be unsecure as the DEX router may be compromised. The owner approves maximum allowance to the router, which is unnecessary. Additionally, the approval is not revoked when the owner's role is transferred or renounced.
Open the reportIt is not recommended to use Solidity's `transfer()` and `send()` functions for transferring native tokens, since some contracts may not be able to receive the funds. Those functions forward only a fixed amount of gas (2300 specifically) and the receiving contracts may run out of gas before finishing the transfer. Also, EVM instructions' gas costs may increase in the future. Thus, some contracts that can receive now may stop working in the future due to the gas limitation. ```solidity=526 payable(_owner).transfer(address(this).balance); ``` - `Monkecoin.sweepContingency` uses `transfer()`.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xfce6…aaaa0xfce692762e907e80a061c01631d15ba7328eaaaa | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Monke, dated 9 Mar 2024 to 29 Mar 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Monkecoin”).
2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for Monke: CertiK and Cyberscope.
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 13 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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