NAOS security record
As of 14 Oct 2026, NAOS has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 24 Nov 2021. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits2
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NAOS-Formation Updates | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
| Naos-Formation | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
Findings20
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 14 |
MediumUnchecked Return ValueNaos-Formation · Quantstamp · 11 Jun 2021Acknowledged
Most functions will return a `true` or `false` value upon success. Some functions, like `send()`, are more crucial to check than others. It's important to ensure that every relevant function is checked. * in `YearnVaultAdapter.sol`, L63, 73: return value not checked
Open the reportLowEconomic attack vector exists due to `flush()`Naos-Formation · Quantstamp · 11 Jun 2021Acknowledged
As "flush" pushes the funds from Formation to the underlying vault, this forces an exchange of assets from underlying token to the external vault's share token. To be safe from economic exploits, it is essential that the share price of the vault cannot be manipulated in a single transaction.
Open the reportLowPrivileged Roles and OwnershipNaos-Formation · Quantstamp · 11 Jun 2021Acknowledged
Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. The governance of the system holds significant amount of power. For example, through governance, it is possible to mint infinite amount of NTokens and Naos. 1. In `NAOSToken` and `TimeToken.sol`, the minter may mint tokens arbitrarily. 2. In `StakingPools`, the governance may set arbitrary minting rates and proportions for each pool. 3. In `Transmuter.distribute`, any whitelisted address can transfer tokens into the buffer from any other address that has approved the `Transmuter` contract. 4. In `Formation.sol`, the governance can set important addresses such as the `oracle`, `transmuter` or `rewards`, which in the worst case could steal all funds.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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