As of 14 Oct 2026, NEMESIS has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by Beosin, dated 21 Jun 2025. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 2 |
In deflationary tokens implemented similarly to SafeMoon, the systemoftendevelops an imbalance in the currentRate (the reflection rate) over time. Thishappens because the contract includes excluded accounts that areremovedfrom the reflection mechanism. The rOwned and _tOwned values for theseaccounts are fixed based on the rate at the time they were excluded. As users continue to transfer tokens, _rTotal decreases due to reflection-basedfees, while _tTotal remains constant. Over time, this causes a distortionintheratio between rSupply and tSupply. Since both values are calculatedbysubtracting the fixed rOwned and _tOwned of the excluded accounts (whichdonot update with the current rate), and _rTotal continues to shrink, thecurrentRate drifts further from its intended balance. At this point, an attacker can exploit the deliver function to profit fromtheliquidity pool (pair). Although the currentRate is already imbalanced, standardtransaction fees are still deducted as a fixed percentage of the transfer amount(e.g., 5%), causing only gradual shifts. In contrast, the deliver functiondeductsthe entire token amount directly from _rTotal without affecting _tTotal, whichsignificantly worsens the rate imbalance. Leveraging this mechanism, the attacker can repeatedly invoke deliver fromthepair address, effectively simulating massive token inflation at minimal cost. This allows them to arbitrage against the distorted pricing and extract profitfrom the pool.
Open the reportBecause _maxTxAmount and numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity are set equal tothe total token supply, the validation on maxTxAmount becomes too permissiveand effectively meaningless. Additionally, the excessively highnumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity value combined with the absence of amethodto adjust it results in a portion of tokens being locked within the contract andrendered unusable.
Open the reportSince the contract has added handling for _developmentFee, the validationinthe removeAllFee function should also include checks for _developmentFee.
Open the reportThe contract allows the administrator to modify the fee rates without enforcingreasonable limits. If the fees are set too high, users may receive significantlyfewer tokens than expected, which could negatively impact theuserexperience.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xa3e5…b5760xa3e53296e78664d71d2b590955210eee6392b576 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x833f…b0680x833f686702e068449fd27dea3187695bb536b068 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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