OMG Network security record

Ethereumomg.network

As of 3 Nov 2026, OMG Network has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Consensys, dated 1 Jan 2020. Those reports list no open critical findings.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across the 2 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits2

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
OmiseGo MoreVPSecurity firm: ConsensysDate: Scope: Not recorded (see the report)1 critical finding, fixedOpen · diligence.security
Omisego Plasma MVPSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · certificate.quantstamp.com

Findings33

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High103
Medium102
Low1708
HighMalicious Token transfer() Function May Block All the Subsequent Exits for the Given TokenOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Correct handling of exits is crucial for the overall security of Plasma chains. A malicious token contract may block all the subsequent exits for the given token by performing a DOS attack from within the function finalizeExits(). Exploit Scenario: 1. Add malicious token contract to RootChain.sol via the function addToken(). 2. finalizeExits() calls transfer() (line 297). 3. transfer() intentionally returns false. 4. finalizeExits() gets reverted undoing queue.delMin() (line 289).

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MediumRecommendation: Remove TxFinalizationModel and TxFinalizationVerifier. Implement stronger checks in MerkleOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowBlockController - inaccurate description of childBlockInterval for submitDepositBlockOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowBondSize - effectiveUpdateTime should be uint64OmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowPaymentExitGame contains several redundant plasmaFramework declarationsOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowPlasmaFramework - Can omit inheritance of VaultRegistryOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowRecommendation: Add a tree height limit check to Merkle.solOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowRecommendation: Implement additional existence and range checks on inputs and storage readsOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowRecommendation: Merge TxPosLib into UtxoPosLib and implement a decode function with range checks.OmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowRecommendation: Remove WireTransaction and PaymentOutputModel. Fold functionality into an extended PaymentTransactionModelOmiseGo MoreVP · Consensys · 1 Jan 2020Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowClone-and-OwnOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

The codebase relies on the clone-and-own approach for code reuse. The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of efort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain asecurity vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. For example, although unused, the function copy() in RLP.sol has an incorrect implementation in line 203, where mload(dest) should be replaced by mload(src).

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LowGas Usage / for Loop ConcernsOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Gas usage is a main concern for smart contract developers and users, since high gas costs may prevent users from wanting to use the smart contract. Even worse, some gas usage issues may prevent the contract from providing services entirely.

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LowLegacy Function ModifiersOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Multiple functions are marked as constant. Furthermore checkSigs() in Validate.sol is marked as internal.

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LowMultiple Invocations of startFeeExit() Could Potentially Block Other ExistsOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

If currentFeeExit becomes large enough and there are 2^128 invocations of startFeeExit(), the fee exits UTXO position may clash with other exits (regular exists and deposit exists) since there is no validation that _utxoPos, should be less than 2^128. Otherwise, the bitwise OR in addExitToQueue() will afect the exitable_at value. Consequently, one can block the other exits. We consider this attack mostly theoretical since the number of required startFeeExit() invocations is impractically large.

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LowOperator Can Exit Any Amount They WantOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Fees in the contract are implicit. The function startFeeExit() allows the operator to exit any amount they want, since the amount is specified as a parameter. The fees will be withdrawn from the same pool that holds users' funds. According to the specification, watchers must keep observing the contract to detect possible fraud and exit users’ funds.

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LowUnlocked PragmaOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format pragma solidity (^)0.4.*. The caret (^) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version and above, hence the term "unlocked."

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LowUnnamed ConstantsOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

Magic numbers, e.g., 1000000000 and 10000, are used across contracts.

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LowUse require instead of assert for argument validationOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

The function checkSigs() uses assert to report post-validate oindex.

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LowViolation of checks-efects-interactions PatternOmisego Plasma MVP · Quantstamp · 22 Oct 2018Open

In the function finalizeExits(), the loop body (lines 287-307) allows the token transfer() call (line 297) to violate checks-efects-interactions pattern, which states that interactions with other contracts should happen at the very end of the function. Consequently transfer() may re-enter finalizeExits().

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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