As of 3 Nov 2026, Omnia Protocol has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 11 Oct 2024. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OMNIA Protocol | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Repository at commit b5098ad | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 12 |
According to Linux doc(https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/time.2.html), "Applications intended to run after 2038 should use ABIs with time_t wider than 32 bits." ```solidity=717 _stakes[stakeId].withdrawnTimestamp = StakingUtils.toUint32(block.timestamp); ``` If the `block.timestamp` was greater than $$2^{32} - 1$$ (4294967295) , it will revert the transaction.
Open the reportThe auditing team has raised the following inquiries concerning the design of the project: 1. There are concerns about potential delays in users being able to unstake their tokens if measurements are not added promptly. We would like to know how long after an epoch ends does the Supervisor add the measurement data for that specific epoch. 2. Once users have staked their tokens, they must wait until the end of the epoch in which their stake expires to unstake. During this period, users are unable to perform an emergency withdrawal. For instance, if a user has staked for the duration of 10 epochs and wishes to withdraw mid-term due to poor performance of the node, currently, this is not permitted. Is this restriction by design? 3. In the `_addMeasurement()` function, measures are added to address potential malicious behavior from supervisors, allowing new supervisors to update measurements linked to the `nodeId`. However, a concern arises regarding the potential impact of malicious measures during the 48-hour waiting period before the execution of methods such as `revokeRole()` or `emergencyPause()`. This delay could allow the effects of malicious measures to persist. Does the team have any contingency plans to mitigate losses resulting from user transactions during this waiting period? 4. We'd like to check with the team the mechanism governing the transfer of rewards into the contract, including the timing and quantity. If rewards are not promptly transferred or if the transferred amount is insufficient, it could potentially hinder the execution of the `unstakeTokens()` function, thereby preventing users from withdrawing their staked principal and rewards as intended.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="omnia-protocol"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us