OneRare security record

Polygon (POS)onerare.io

As of 3 Nov 2026, OneRare has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 11 Jul 2022. That report lists no open critical findings.

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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
OneRare V2Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High032
Medium001
Low012
HighCentralization Related RisksOneRare V2 · CertiK · 11 Jul 2022Acknowledged

**In the contract `ORareGame` the role `_owner` and `admin` have authority over the following functions:** - `updateDishLock()` - `addOrUpdateDishRecipe()` - `addOrUpdateMultipleDishRecipe()` - `createDish()` Any compromise to the privileged accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change dish NFT recipes or lock a dish. **In the contract `OneRareMarketplace` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-OneRareMarketplace-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change fee receiver address or drain the OrareNft tokens in the marketplace. **In the contract `ORareNft` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-ORareNft-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set arbitrary accounts as the game contract that can mint OrareNFT tokens. **In the contract `NftRewardVault` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-NftRewardVault-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. set the number of tokens available for distribution and set arbitrary accounts as whitelisted operators, which could interrupt NFT reward distribution in the staking contract. Stakers can not claim their staking rewards when the vault balance is insufficient. **In the contract `ORareNftStaking` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/4c8d3e789b93478d96c4bea1d41ddfea/diagrams/centralization-ORareNftStaking-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. e.g. change the reward rate, set unbonding period, or close an open stake, which could interrupt the rewards distribution.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOneRare V2 · CertiK · 11 Jul 2022Acknowledged

`ORareNftStaking`, `ORareGame`, and `OneRareMarketPlace` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

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HighPrivileged Function Allows `Owner` to Withdraw alOneRare V2 · CertiK · 11 Jul 2022Acknowledged

Function `recoverERC20()` in `ORareNftStaking.sol` allows the controller of the contract owner to withdraw all of the `Orare` tokens staked in the `OneRareStaking` contract, which could lead to a rug pull.

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LowFunction `getUnclaimedRewardsFor()` may return inOneRare V2 · CertiK · 11 Jul 2022Acknowledged

Function `getUnclaimedRewardsFor()` may return incorrect value when `updateRewardsPerSec()` is in process. In this case, for users that have been processed, `user.rewardDebt` is reset while `_accRewardPerShare` is not.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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