Ozolio security record
As of 30 Oct 2026, Ozolio has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by QuillAudits, dated 10 Feb 2025. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OZolio | Security firm: QuillAudits | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · quillaudits.com |
Findings4
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 1 |
HighSome funds are stuck due to division before multiplicationOZolio · QuillAudits · 10 Feb 2025Fixed
The wallets tokenAllocation "_T" is first divided before being multiplied, this will lead to the allocation being rounded down before being multiplied
Open the reportHighThe nonce increment mechanism is improperly implementedOZolio · QuillAudits · 10 Feb 2025Fixed
The nonce increment mechanism is improperly implemented, resulting in nonces never being incremented. This completely breaks the replay protection mechanism of the meta-transaction system.The vulnerability stems from the misuse of the post-increment operator (++). In Solidity, when using post-increment, the following sequence occurs: The current value is returned The value is incremented The returned value (pre-increment) is assigned back to the variable Therefore: If nonce starts at 0 nonces[userAddress]++ returns 0 and increments to 1 nonces[userAddress] = then assigns 0 back The nonce effectively never changes
Open the reportMediumUses Ownable2StepUpgradeable instead of Ownable UpgradeableOZolio · QuillAudits · 10 Feb 2025Fixed
One issue is that the contract does not utilize the __Ownable2StepUpgradeable_init() function, designed to facilitate a two-step ownership transfer process. Without this mechanism, ownership transfers occur immediately, exposing the contract to potential risks. The two-step process enhances security by requiring a confirmation step before ownership is fully transferred, thereby reducing the likelihood of unauthorized access or control over the contract.
Open the reportLowEnhance Contract Robustness and SecurityOZolio · QuillAudits · 10 Feb 2025Fixed
Add the sanity checks and best practices that make the contract more robust SafeERC20: Replaced direct token.transfer() with token.safeTransfer() to prevent issues with tokens that don't return true on successful transfers.Non-Negative N Check: Added a require(N >= 0, ...) check before converting N to a uint256 in claimableAmount() to prevent unexpected behavior if the vesting calculation results in a negative claimable amount.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
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