Particle Network security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, Particle Network has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 27 May 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Particle Network - MPC Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings13
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Low | 4 | 0 | 5 |
LowMisleading Function ParameterParticle Network - MPC Audit · CertiK · 27 May 2023Open
The `comm_witness` parameter is passed to the `EphKeyGenSecondMsg::verify_and_decommit` and `KeyGenSecondMsg::verify_and_decommit` but it is not necessary for any operation connected to the proof verification. The parameter may be misleading for any library user as an information which is unnecessary in respect to the function name semantic needs to be provided.
Open the reportLowMisleading Variable NamesParticle Network - MPC Audit · CertiK · 27 May 2023Open
The audited codebase represents the implementation of scientific papers, however, the variable's names differ from the paper's notation reducing the code readability.
Open the reportLowSpecification for Paillier Key GenerationParticle Network - MPC Audit · CertiK · 27 May 2023Open
The key generation of the Paillier Scheme produces a public key of bit length 2048. In the `verify_ni_proof_correct_key` of `party_two.rs`, the length of the public key is required to be larger than 2046 to not return an `Err`. ```rust const PAILLIER_KEY_SIZE: usize = 2048; ... if ek.n.bit_length() < PAILLIER_KEY_SIZE - 1 ```
Open the reportLowStrong RSA Assumption for Zero-knowledge ProofParticle Network - MPC Audit · CertiK · 27 May 2023Open
During the construction of the proof `PDLwSlackProof`, Party 1 constructs the following values via the function `generate_h1_h2_n_tilde`: - $\tilde{N}$ which is the product of two safe primes `dk_tilde.p` and `dk_tilde.q`; - the values $h_1$ and $h_2$ in the group $Z_{\tilde{N}}$. The soundness of the proof is dependent on the strong RSA assumption on the modulus $\tilde{N}$. However there is no guarantee that the primes `dk_tilde.p` and `dk_tilde.q` are safe. This condition is referenced in the file [zk_pdl_with_slack/mod.rs](https://reitermk.github.io/papers/2001/CRYPTO.pdf).
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