Pheasant Network security record

Arbitrum, Ethereum, Optimism, Polygon (POS)pheasant.networkX

As of 17 Nov 2026, Pheasant Network has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Hashlock, dated 1 Apr 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings.

Critical findings
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Across 2 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Pheasant Network smart contract auditSecurity firm: HashlockDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
Pheasant NetworkSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗

Findings42

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0283
Medium0321
Low0554

Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firms. Not counted as findings.

InformationalDesign Flaws of Having only One RelayerPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Acknowledged

Based on the current system, the Relayer can perform two actions: 1. It is possible for a malicious Relayer to front-run any detected valid slash attempt against him with the functions `slash()` and `slashUpwardTrade()`. As a result, he will recover half of the slashed amount. In the end, the Relayer will remain with the amount he got from the user and half the slashed amount. 2. Also, the Relayer can get back deposited funds from the Bond Manager by: * initiating a trade of `_amount` using a second address `a2`. * ignoring that trade request. * initiating a dispute with `a2` to get as rewards `>100%` of `_amount` from the Bond Manager (because half will be sent to him as a disputer, and half will be sent to him as a trade user).

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InformationalTwo-Step Update Mechanism Lets Invalid Requests Get Recorded on-ChainPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Acknowledged

A two-step update mechanism distinguishes the action to plan the update of a contract parameter and the action to execute that update. A minimum delay of `UPDATE_PERIOD` must pass before the second action can be executed. Integrity constraints are checked during the second step. It means that an invalid request can be recorded on-chain in the first step, even if it will fail during the second step. That mechanism can be found in the contracts: 1. PolygonChildCheckpointManager 2. CoreChildCheckpointManager 3. BondManager 4. PheasantNetworkBridgeChild

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InformationalDead CodePheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Fixed

"Dead" code refers to code that is never executed and hence makes no impact on the final result of running a program. Dead code raises a concern since either the code is unnecessary or the necessary code's results were ignored. 1. `Types.sol` defines the `Trade` structure with a field named `disputeTimestamp`. In the codebase, this is set to `block.timestamp`, and it is not modified in any function providing the same data as `Trade.timestamp`. 2. `PheasantNetworkBridgeChild.withdraw()` contains two commented `require()` statements.

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InformationalGas Fees when Submitting Block HashesPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Fixed

If the gas fees for submitting a block hash to L2 from L1 (e.g. ETH Mainnet) are higher than the potential disputer fee, no disputer will submit the block and the evidence validation will revert.

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UndeterminedLack of Documentation of Centralized DesignPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Fixed

Currently, the relayer is a trusted entity in the protocol. As we pointed out in other issues, while there is the potential of slashing, the bonded assets are not tied to individually, slashable trades. Furthermore, pending updates overwriting most of the global variables of the `PheasantNetworkBridgeChild` can be activated after a three hours waiting period at any time, resulting in theoretically slashable trades becoming unslashable. Additionally, the pause mechanism theoretically enables the relayer to walk away with the funds of all pending trades. The developers also made clear that there will currently only be one active relayer controlled by the team, further resulting in the centralization of the system. While the project's roadmap contains a pathway to a more decentralized and trustless protocol, it is currently not fully implemented.

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InformationalPayable FunctionsPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Fixed

`payable` keyword in a function allows the caller to send funds to the smart contract when calling that function. However, if funds are not expected this can be confusing for users and can lead to loss of funds. The following functions are not expected to receive funds and are marked as `payable`: - `BondManager.finalizeWithdrawalBond()` - `BondManager.slash()`

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InformationalUnlocked PragmaPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Fixed

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format`pragma solidity (^)0.8.*`. The caret (`^`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version *and above*, hence the term "unlocked". Furthermore, some of the files are locked to a specific version (i.e. `PolygonPheasantNetworkBridgeChild.sol`), while others remain unlocked (i.e.`OptimismRootCheckpointManager.sol`).

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InformationalClone-and-OwnPheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Mitigated

The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries.

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UndeterminedSystem Not Compatible with `transferFrom()`Pheasant Network · Quantstamp · 2 Aug 2023Mitigated

In `checkERC20TransferTx()`, the transaction is validated to match the signature of `transfer(address,uint256)` function. If a user transfers an ERC-20 token using `transferFrom()`, the evidence validation will fail.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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