PLANET audit reports

PLANET has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 12 Jul 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm11

Statuses are the security firms’ own

11 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 7 low (all open).

High
2
Medium
2
Low
7
  • High Open

    Centralization Risks in PLANET.sol

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Missing initialization of currentTaxes

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Potential Transfer Out All Taxes

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Confused and Redundant logic

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Divide Before Multiply

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect Modifier

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Redundant Statements

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Redundant Writes

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    PLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

All 11 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
PLANETSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on EthereumNone openFindings: 3 high · 2 medium · 7 low
1 fixed · 11 open
Original removed

Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium200
Low700
HighCentralization Risks in PLANET.solPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/95a0b3949f4b4eaabdee196551403ed8/diagrams/centralization_PLANET-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `PLANET` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - drain all `Eth` from the contract through `rescueETH()`. - drain all tokens from the contract through `rescueERC20()`. - exclude or include addresses from paying fees. - set `taxes`, `sellTaxes`, `maxWalletLimit`, `tokenLiquidityThreshold` without reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrary values after deploying. - change the value of `providingLiquidity`. - set the address of `marketingWallet`. - set `isearlybuyer`, users in this mapping cannot transfer their tokens until the owner moves them out of the mapping. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/95a0b3949f4b4eaabdee196551403ed8/diagrams/centralization_PLANET-PLANET-_owner.svg)

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HighInitial Token DistributionPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

All of the **PLANET** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the anonymous deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the deployer account that holds undistributed tokens may allow the attacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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MediumMissing initialization of currentTaxesPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

In the function `_transfer()`, the `currentTaxes` is not initialized in the below case. ```solidity } else if (useLaunchFee) { feeswap = launchtax; feesum = launchtax; } ``` If the threshold has been reached, the `handle_fees()` will fail in this case.

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MediumPotential Transfer Out All TaxesPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

The `tokenLiquidityThreshold` can be set to arbitrary values. If `tokenLiquidityThreshold` is set to a big enough value, the taxes will not be used for liquidity until the `tokenLiquidityThreshold` is reached. Based on the logic of the below functions, the owner has the ability to transfer out all taxes before the `tokenLiquidityThreshold` is reached. ```solidity function updateLiquidityTreshhold(uint256 new_amount) external onlyOwner { //update the treshhold tokenLiquidityThreshold = new_amount * 10**decimals(); } function rescueETH(uint256 weiAmount) external onlyOwner { payable(owner()).transfer(weiAmount); } function rescueERC20(address tokenAdd, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { IERC20(tokenAdd).transfer(owner(), amount); } ```

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LowConfused and Redundant logicPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

```solidity if (sender == pair && !exemptFee[recipient] && !_liquidityMutex) { require(balanceOf(recipient) + amount <= maxWalletLimit, "You are exceeding maxWalletLimit" ); } if (sender != pair && !exemptFee[recipient] && !exemptFee[sender] && !_liquidityMutex) { if (recipient != pair) { require(balanceOf(recipient) + amount <= maxWalletLimit, "You are exceeding maxWalletLimit" ); } } ``` `maxWalletLimit` validation in the above code conditions can be bypassed if `_liquidityMutex` is true. The state variable `_liquidityMutex` will only be true inside the `handle_fees()` function. However, in the `handle_fees()`, tokens are only transferred to the pair. Hence this `&& !_liquidityMutex` logic is redundant.

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LowDivide Before MultiplyPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

Performing integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation. ```solidity=615 uint256 unitBalance = deltaBalance / (denominator - swapTaxes.liquidity); ``` ```solidity=616 uint256 ethToAddLiquidityWith = unitBalance * swapTaxes.liquidity; ```

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LowIncorrect ModifierPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

In a modifier, the `_` symbol is used to continue the execution of the function with the modifier applied. If a modifier does not execute `_` or revert, the modifier will not execute the function body and in that case the return variables are set to their default values just as if the function had an empty body, which can be misleading for the caller. Modifier PLANET.mutexLock() (PLANET.sol#444-450) does not always execute _; or revert ```solidity=444 modifier mutexLock() { if (!_liquidityMutex) { _liquidityMutex = true; _; _liquidityMutex = false; } } ```

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LowRedundant StatementsPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

The `feesum` eqauls the `feeswap` in all cases. The linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase.

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LowRedundant WritesPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

Variables are written but never read and subsequently written again, suggesting potential inefficiencies or logic errors in the code. This may lead to confusion when analyzing the code or impact the performance of the smart contract during execution. `fee` is written twice, but not used in-between. Since the `feesum` is not initialized in this case, it defaults to zero and the fee is set to zero in L574 again. ```solidity=554 fee = 0; ``` ```solidity=574 fee = (amount * feesum) / 100; ```

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LowThird-Party Dependency UsagePLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=415 IRouter public router; ``` - The contract `PLANET` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter` interface via `router`.

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LowToo Many DigitsPLANET · CertiK · 12 Jul 2023Open

Literals with many digits are difficult to read and review. ```solidity=422 uint256 private tokenLiquidityThreshold = 2000000000 * 10**18; ``` --- ```solidity=423 uint256 public maxWalletLimit = 20000000000 * 10**18; ``` --- ```solidity=453 _tokengeneration(msg.sender, 1000000000010 * 10**decimals()); ```

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x2ad9addd0d97ec3cdba27f92bf6077893b76ab0bChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

PLANET: questions

Is PLANET audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for PLANET, dated 12 Jul 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“PLANET”).

Who audited PLANET?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for PLANET.

Are there open findings in PLANET’s audits?

11 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 7 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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