Incident
Incident,
The contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens.
Source: De.Fi incident database.
- Audits before it
- 0.
- Audits since
- 2, the latest dated 27 Feb 2025.
Pluto security record
As of 15 Oct 2026, Pluto has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Cyberscope, dated 27 Feb 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain and 1 incident (latest 1 Jan 2021).
Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across 2 reports.
Incident
Incident 1 Jan 2021
Source: De.Fi incident database. 2 audits have been published since. See the incident
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Get the label for your siteRecord last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits2
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pluto | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · cyberscope.io |
| Pluto | Security firm: QuillAudits | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · quillaudits.com |
Findings14
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 5 |
HighBorrowers Face Immediate Liquidation Risk After Protocol Freeze is LiftedPluto · QuillAudits · 4 Nov 2024Open
The protocol's check_freeze mechanism halts both repayment and liquidation operations during a freeze, ensuring that no transactions are processed. This freeze is designed to safeguard the protocol in exceptional scenarios, but it unintentionally creates an issue for borrowers. When the protocol is frozen: - Borrowers are unable to repay their debts and improve their health factors. - Liquidators cannot liquidate over-leveraged positions. During the freeze, external market fluctuations (e.g., price drops in collateral assets) can worsen borrowers' health factors, potentially pushing them below the liquidation threshold. Once the freeze is lifted, these vulnerable positions become immediate targets for liquidation. Borrowers are left at a significant disadvantage, unable to preemptively secure their positions due to the enforced freeze.
Open the reportHighMissing Confidence Interval Handling in Pyth Price FeedsPluto · QuillAudits · 4 Nov 2024Open
The protocol uses Pyth's get_price_no_older_than function in several core functionalities, including VaultLeverageClose, VaultLeverageEject, VaultLeverageSafe, VaultLeverageFund, VaultLeverageLiquidate, VaultLeverageSetIndex, and VaultLeverageTakeProfit. However, the confidence interval (μ±σ) provided by Pyth, which defines the range where the true price likely lies with 95% probability, is ignored in these implementations. The lack of confidence interval consideration leads to a narrow interpretation of price accuracy and leaves the protocol exposed to volatile or uncertain market conditions. Confidence intervals provide critical safeguards against price uncertainty during market turbulence or price manipulation, allowing protocols to adjust valuations conservatively to prevent over-leveraging or unnecessary liquidations.
Open the reportLowUsers Can Bypass Fees by Depositing Slightly Less Than the Minimum Fee ThresholdPluto · QuillAudits · 4 Nov 2024Open
The earn_vault_deposit function in the provided Solana program is responsible for handling the deposit of tokens into an earnings vault. This function is called via the handler_vault_earn_deposit function, which implements the core logic. The current implementation allows users to deposit amounts slightly less than the threshold where the fee calculation would yield a non-zero value. This leads to a fee = 0 scenario, allowing the user to bypass fees entirely. By depositing in such small increments repeatedly, users can unfairly accumulate vault units without contributing to the fee pool.
Open the reportIncidents1
Attached through a shared contract address. Our incident data ends in Oct 2026.
Contracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x409cf201e81fc1e8538eb329e20a8513fcee996c | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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